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Did Universal Banks Play a Significant
Role in the U.S. Economy’s
Boom-and-Bust Cycle of 1921–33?
A Preliminary Assessment
ARTHUR E. WILMARTH, JR.

Commercial banking organizations were leading participants in
the U.S. securities markets during the great bull market of the 1920s.1
Commercial banks again entered the securities markets during the
1990s, and their reentry coincided with another spectacular rise in the
stock market. The stock market booms of the 1920s and 1990s were
extraordinary events in U.S. economic history. As two scholars recently observed, the bull markets of 1923–29 and 1994–2000 “stand
out, both in terms of their length and rate of advance in the market
index … . [T]hese two booms were unique in character as well as
magnitude.”2
The stock market crashes that followed both booms were also
unparalleled. From 1929 to 1932, the total value of all common stocks
listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) fell by nearly
85 percent, from US$82.1 billion to US$12.7 billion.3 From 2000 to
2002, the value of all publicly traded U.S. stocks declined by more
than 40 percent, from US$17 trillion to US$10 trillion.4
In both the 1920s and the 1990s, commercial banking organizations were allowed to operate as “universal banks”—that is, diversified financial conglomerates that offered banking, securities, and
insurance services.5 Is it merely a coincidence that the two most dramatic stock market booms and crashes in U.S. history occurred during
periods when large commercial banks were major participants in the
securities markets? Or did the exercise of universal banking powers
contribute to the financial and economic conditions that produced
both episodes? This chapter is the first installment of a longer-term
project that seeks to answer these questions.
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This chapter offers a preliminary assessment of the role played by
universal banks in the economic boom-and-bust cycle of 1921–33.
The first part reviews the successful challenge to universal banking
mounted by Senator Carter Glass and other advocates of the Banking
Act of 1933 (popularly known as the “Glass-Steagall Act”).6 The
Glass-Steagall Act emphatically repudiated the concept of “department store banking” (an early version of universal banking).7 Sections
20 and 32 of the Act required commercial banks to divest the securities affiliates they had operated during the 1920s, while three other
sections imposed further restrictions designed to separate banks from
securities firms.8
Glass and his supporters contended that banks and their securities
affiliates helped to produce an inflationary surge in the securities
markets, resulting in an overproduction of securities and an unsustainable economic boom. Proponents of the Glass-Steagall Act also
maintained that department store banking created conflicts of interest
that prevented commercial banks from acting either as impartial lenders or as objective investment advisors. Glass and his colleagues
claimed that universal banks provided excessive amounts of credit
and used aggressive marketing campaigns to promote the sale of risky
securities to unsophisticated investors. The Glass-Steagall Act reflected a widely shared belief that banks and their securities affiliates
encouraged speculative and ultimately ruinous behavior by investors
and business firms.
To evaluate the validity of these claims, the second part of this
chapter examines the role of universal banks during the economic
boom of the 1920s. In response to a relaxation of legal rules
governing bank activities, banks greatly expanded their financing of
business firms and consumers through five major channels—loans on
securities, securities investments, public offerings of securities, real
estate mortgages, and consumer credit. This financing surge enabled
business firms and consumers to assume heavy debt burdens and to
make risky investments that proved to be unviable when the U.S.
economy entered a sharp recession in the summer of 1929. Many of
the new investments in plant and equipment were devoted to
speculative ventures that overestimated the near-term demand for
products using new technologies. Supply also exceeded demand for
new cars and for newly constructed residential and commercial real
estate projects.
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The crash of 1929 destroyed investor wealth and created great
uncertainty among consumers and business firms. The business recession that began in the summer of 1929 was aggravated by the crash,
and the decline in business activity exposed the hazardous levels of
debt assumed by consumers and business firms during the boom years
of the 1920s. Congress decided to separate banks from securities
firms in 1933, based on its determination that universal banking had
promoted a dangerous buildup of credit for speculative purposes.
The Glass-Steagall Act’s barriers to universal banking were severely eroded by market forces and by a series of rulings issued by
federal regulators and courts during the 1980s and 1990s. In 1989,
federal regulators allowed bank holding companies to establish what
were known as “Section 20 subsidiaries” for the purpose of underwriting debt and equity securities. By 1996, due to a progressive liberalization of the rules governing Section 20 subsidiaries, banking
organizations could compete effectively with securities firms. In
1998, federal regulators allowed Travelers and Citicorp to merge,
thereby creating Citigroup, the first U.S. universal bank since 1933.
The creation of Citigroup placed great pressure on Congress to remove the Glass-Steagall Act’s limitations on affiliations between
commercial banks and securities firms.9
In 1999, Congress responded to these developments by enacting
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA).10 GLBA repealed Sections 20
and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act and also authorized the establishment of universal banking organizations known as financial holding
companies. Under GLBA, financial holding companies may establish
separate subsidiaries that engage in a full range of banking, securities,
and insurance activities.11
The House and Senate committee reports on GLBA declared that
the Glass-Steagall Act’s restrictions on universal banking were (1)
outdated in light of changing market conditions and (2) undesirable
because they prevented U.S. financial institutions from providing innovative services to their customers in the most efficient manner.12
The chief Senate sponsor of GLBA, Senator Phil Gramm, went even
further. He denounced the Glass-Steagall Act as a misguided statute
from the outset. In his view, Congress was frightened by the Depres-
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sion and was driven by “demagoguery” to impose a “punitive … artificial separation of the financial sector of our economy.”13
In claiming that the Glass-Steagall Act was an ill-conceived statute, Senator Gramm echoed the conclusions of works published by
several scholars during the past two decades. As discussed in the final
section of the chapter, modern scholars have criticized the
Glass-Steagall Act on three principal grounds. First, critics argue that
the Glass-Steagall Act was interest group legislation designed to protect traditional investment banks from competition with commercial
banks in the securities underwriting field. Second, critics maintain
that universal banks were safer than specialized banks and did not
endanger the banking system. Third, critics claim that Congress did
not have a substantial basis for its belief that universal banks were
involved in unsound selling practices and other conflicts of interest.
Thus, Congress’s partial repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999
was consistent with a widely shared scholarly view that the 1933 legislation had been “[t]horoughly discredited.”14 However, since the
bursting of the “new economy” stock market bubble in 2000, commentators have begun to reconsider the benefits and risks of universal
banking. Investigations and court suits involving Enron and WorldCom revealed that Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase (Morgan Chase),
and other universal banks played key roles in both scandals. For example, Citigroup, Morgan Chase, and other universal banks helped
Enron to inflate its reported revenues and understate its reported debts
by (1) extending loans that were disguised as prepay commodity
trades and (2) arranging sham sales of Enron assets to
off-balance-sheet entities controlled by Enron. In addition, Citigroup,
Morgan Chase, Bank of America, and other universal banks served as
underwriters for two large public offerings of WorldCom debt securities during 2000 and 2001. Those offerings enabled WorldCom to sell
US$17 billion of securities to investors at a time when the bank underwriters reportedly knew that WorldCom’s financial condition was
rapidly deteriorating.15 Similarly, Italian authorities have alleged that
Citigroup, Bank of America, and other universal banks aided and
abetted a massive fraud committed by Parmalat’s managers.16
In 2003, federal regulators and the New York Attorney General,
Eliot Spitzer, issued consent orders as part of a global settlement with
10 investment banking firms, including affiliates of five universal
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banks (Citigroup, Morgan Chase, Credit Suisse, UBS, and U.S. Bancorp). According to those consent orders, the 10 firms encouraged
their research analysts to attract and retain investment banking clients
by issuing overly optimistic projections of future client performance
and ignoring client risks that were known to the analysts and their
investment banking colleagues.17 Federal regulators also issued consent orders finding that (1) Citigroup, Credit Suisse, FleetBoston, and
Morgan Chase engaged in manipulative and abusive practices involving initial public offerings,18 and (2) Bank of America, Bank One,
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), and FleetBoston allowed hedge fund operators to make late trades and market-timing
trades in bank-sponsored mutual funds, resulting in large trading profits for the operators at the expense of ordinary investors in the mutual
funds.19
The foregoing scandals and other examples of recent misconduct
by universal banks will be reviewed in greater detail in a forthcoming
installment of my project. These scandals have already proven to be
very costly to universal banks. By August 2005, universal banks and
other firms paid over US$7 billion to settle Enron-related lawsuits,
with US$6.6 billion of that amount being paid by CIBC, Citigroup,
and Morgan Chase. The same three banks paid an additional US$400
million in penalties to settle Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) charges related to their involvement with Enron.20 Universal
banks and other firms paid more than US$6 billion to settle
WorldCom-related lawsuits, with US$5 billion of that amount being
paid by Citigroup, Morgan Chase, and Bank of America. Universal
banks and other firms also paid US$4.4 billion to settle regulatory
claims involving analyst conflicts of interest and abusive trading
practices in mutual funds.21
In light of the growing evidence of conflicts of interest and other
abuses involving universal banks during the economic boom from
1994 to 2000, several commentators have argued that federal regulators and Congress made a mistake in allowing commercial banks to
establish new affiliations with securities firms. These commentators
maintain that Congress underestimated the risks that (1) conflicts of
interest would undermine the ability of universal banks to allocate
credit and provide investment advice in an objective and impartial
manner, and (2) competitive pressures in the securities underwriting

564 The Role of Universal Banks in the Boom-and-Bust Cycle of 1921–33

business would cause both universal banks and securities firms to
promote unsound and speculative ventures.22
From a practical viewpoint, it seems very unlikely that the
Glass-Steagall Act’s separation between commercial and investment
banking could be revived. Even before GLBA’s enactment in 1999,
the effectiveness of Glass-Steagall had been significantly undermined
by market forces and by decisions of federal regulators and courts that
opened loopholes in the 1933 statute. For example, the rapidly growing markets for over-the-counter derivatives and syndicated loans
have allowed banks to provide customers with financial instruments
that are functionally equivalent to securities.23 However, the recent
scandals involving universal banks raise serious questions about the
adequacy of the regulatory structure created by GLBA. In a forthcoming article, I will consider possible reforms that could mitigate the
risks currently presented by universal banks.
Accordingly, this chapter does not propose a reenactment of the
Glass-Steagall Act. However, it will offer a preliminary response to
the modern, three-part critique of Glass-Steagall. First, I conclude that
the 1933 legislation was not adopted for the purpose of protecting
investment banks from competition with commercial banks. Second,
it appears that Congress did have a substantial basis for its belief that
universal banks created serious risks for the banking system and the
general economy. Third, previous scholars have determined, based on
the Pecora committee’s investigation in 1933, that commercial banks
and their securities affiliates did engage in unsound and abusive practices. I believe that the second and third issues warrant additional research, particularly since similar abuses appeared during the 1990s
when major banks reentered the securities markets.

Congress’s Repudiation of Universal Banking in the
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933
The Glass-Steagall Act contained five provisions designed to
separate commercial banks from the investment banking business.24
Congress adopted these provisions based on the widely shared view
that banks and their securities affiliates had played a major role in the
boom and crash that occurred in U.S. securities markets and the
broader economy from 1921 to 1933. As shown below, supporters of
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the Glass-Steagall Act were convinced that banks and their securities
affiliates had diverted credit away from sound business enterprises
and, instead, promoted speculative ventures at home and abroad.
The Act’s chief sponsor, Senator Carter Glass, and his principal
advisor, Professor H. Parker Willis, subscribed to the “real bills doctrine.” Adherents of that doctrine believed that commercial banks
should restrict their operations to the acceptance of demand deposits
and the extension of short-term loans to finance the production and
sale of goods.25 Senator Glass, Representative Henry Steagall, and
other members of Congress alleged that large banks had abandoned
sound banking principles during the 1920s and, instead, had promoted
“stock-gambling” and an “overinvestment in securities of all kinds.”26
Glass, Steagall, and their supporters maintained that large banks had
encouraged reckless speculation in two ways—first, by using their
own funds to make excessive loans on securities and investments in
securities, and second, by persuading retail investors and small correspondent banks to convert their deposits and investments in U.S. government securities into high-risk corporate, municipal, and foreign
securities underwritten by bank securities affiliates.27
Thus, Congress viewed the activities of banks and their securities
affiliates as a fundamental cause of the economic boom and crash that
occurred during the period 1921–33. Steagall, for example, declared
that the entry of banks into the securities markets produced a situation
in which
[o]ur great banking system was diverted from its original
purposes into investment activities, and its service devoted to
speculation and international high finance… . Agriculture,
commerce, and industry were forgotten. Bank deposits and
credit resources were funneled into the speculative centers of
the country for investment in stocks [sic] operation and in
market speculation. Values were lifted to fictitious levels.28
Senator Frederick Walcott argued that this “gambling fever” and
“flood tide of speculation” would never have occurred without the
credit and distribution facilities provided by large banks and their securities affiliates. In Walcott’s view, traditional investment banking
firms like J.P. Morgan and Kuhn Loeb could never have arranged and
financed the rapid expansion in securities underwriting, trading, and
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selling that took place during the 1920s. Such an expansion required
much broader distribution capabilities and “very expansive credit,
which, of course, brought in the banks.” As for bank securities affiliates, “their growth has been phenomenal, coincident with the growth
of the security business.”29
Representative Hamilton Fish agreed that large banks and their
securities affiliates were primarily responsible for the speculative “inflation” that led to the Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression:
[T]hese bank presidents … got us into this inflation largely
through these securities affiliates connected with the big
banks. …
All the time they were saying to their depositors, “You have
got money in our banks, and you ought to take it out of our
banks and invest it.” … Those securities affiliates did more
harm in promoting the inflation and the resulting deflation
that caused the financial ruin of hundreds of thousands of
bank depositors than any other agency in America. …
There was an enormous inflation brought about because of
the mass overproduction of stocks, bonds, and other
securities largely emanating from these affiliates, … and as a
result it meant a mass overproduction of factories,
commodities, real estate, and everything else—an enormous
inflation that sooner or later had to crash. …30
While noting the dangers of speculation, Senator Robert Bulkley
focused on conflicts of interest that were created by affiliations between banks and securities dealers. In Bulkley’s view, a bank connected with a securities affiliate could not provide fair and impartial
investment advice to its depositors and its trust customers, because
the bank had a vested interest in promoting securities that were underwritten or distributed by the affiliate. Nor could such a bank be
expected to make objective lending decisions, because it would be
tempted to make unsound loans to support its securities affiliate or the
customers of that affiliate.31 Bulkley explained that
the greatest protection to depositors that we have given in
[the Glass-Steagall Act] is … [by] prohibiting a banker from
having an interest contrary to his depositors, by prohibiting
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him from being interested in securities which he recommends his depositor to buy, by … removing the bankers
from the temptation of using credit in such a way as to make
a good background and foundation for the flotation [of] more
security issues. …32
Similar concerns about conflicts of interest were expressed in a
1931 staff report prepared by a Senate subcommittee during hearings
on the securities activities of banks. This report identified a number of
potential dangers created by affiliations between banks and securities
dealers, including the following:
(i) the bank might make risky loans or capital contributions to a
securities affiliate, particularly as “[t]he bank is closely connected in
the public mind with its affiliates, and should the latter suffer large
losses it is practically unthinkable that they would be allowed to
fail”;33
(ii) the bank could purchase stock from a securities affiliate to
“relieve the affiliate of excess holdings”;34
(iii) the bank could make risky loans to a securities affiliate’s
customers in order to “facilitate” the affiliate’s distribution of
securities;35
(iv) a securities affiliate might try to support the market price of
the bank’s stock by using aggressive or manipulative trading
practices;36
(v) a securities affiliate might consider the bank’s depositors as
“its preferred list of sales prospects,” and the depositors’ confidence
in the bank would be severely shaken if they lost money after purchasing securities that were underwritten or distributed by the affiliate;37 and
(vi) in general, the bank and its securities affiliate would be
tempted to take greater risks because of their assumption that (a) the
affiliate could rely on the “resources of the bank” and (b) the bank
could remove poorly performing loans or investments from its balance sheet by transferring them to its affiliate.38
As discussed in this chapter, the Senate investigation led by Ferdinand Pecora in 1933 focused much of its attention on alleged conflicts
of interest involving large banks and their securities affiliates.
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During Senate hearings in 1931 and Senate floor debates in
1932, participants frequently mentioned two major financial
conglomerates—Caldwell and Company and Bank of United States—
that collapsed during the autumn of 1930.39 As discussed below, both
organizations controlled securities subsidiaries that engaged in risky
activities and relied heavily on loans provided by affiliated banks.40
During final deliberations on the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933,
members of Congress also commented on the recent failures of four
large Detroit and Cleveland banks. All four banks had securities
affiliates, and the failures of those banks helped to precipitate a
nationwide banking panic culminating in President Roosevelt’s
declaration of a national bank holiday in March 1933.41
Commercial banks and the Hoover administration strongly opposed Senator Glass’s proposed legislation in 1931 and 1932 and
were successful in preventing its passage. However, the election of
President Franklin Roosevelt and a heavily Democratic Congress in
November 1932 greatly increased the political leverage held by Glass
and his supporters. Glass himself made a nationwide radio address on
Roosevelt’s behalf in the closing days of the 1932 campaign. In that
speech, he condemned the “great banking institutions” for having
used their “lawless affiliates” to sell worthless securities to American
investors. During the spring of 1933, commercial banking interests
lost all remaining power to block the Glass bill, due to the devastating
impact of the nationwide banking panic and the public outrage triggered by the Pecora committee’s investigation of bank securities affiliates. In addition, many banks voluntarily decided to shut down
their securities affiliates, because they could not afford to absorb the
affiliates’ expenses and losses.42 Consequently, effective opposition
to the Glass bill virtually disappeared and Congress passed the
Glass-Steagall Act on June 16, 1933.43

The Role of Banks in the Boom-and-Bust Cycle of 1921–33
As shown in the preceding section, the Glass-Steagall Act reflected Congress’s belief that commercial banks and their securities
affiliates helped to generate an unsustainable economic boom during
the late 1920s. Senator Glass had no doubt on this score, arguing that
bank securities affiliates “were the largest contributors, next to the
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gambling on the stock exchange, to the disaster which was precipitated on this country in 1929.”44 The conclusions of Senator Glass
and his supporters rested in part on the fact that the stock market
boom of the 1920s coincided with the rapid expansion of bank involvement in the securities markets:
[F]rom just a common-sense, cause-and-effect standpoint,
one could easily make a formidable argument against the security affiliate system. No sooner had [banks become major
participants in the securities markets] than the great bull
market had gotten under way! During the period from 1928
through 1930, commercial banks had substantially increased
their market share of the new bond issues and had begun to
make inroads into the equity market. No matter what significance one might give that development today, certainly to
the national legislators of the early 1930s the probable correlation must have made a strong impression. This was particularly true of a financial “purist” like Carter Glass.45
As described in this section, banks contributed to the economic
boom of the late 1920s through five different channels—loans on securities, securities investments, public offerings of securities, real estate lending, and consumer credit. All of these channels generated a
surge of new financing, which greatly increased the debt burdens of
business firms and consumers and encouraged speculative investments by both groups.
Banks Became Leading Participants in the Securities Markets
During the 1920s
The Rapid Expansion of Bank Securities Activities
During the decade preceding the stock market crash, banks
greatly expanded their involvement in the securities markets in three
areas: (1) making loans collateralized by securities (known as “loans
on securities” or “security loans”), (2) making investments in securities, and (3) participating in the underwriting and distribution of securities. Bank loans on securities increased from US$5.2 billion to
US$13 billion between 1919 and 1930. As a result, the share of total
bank credit represented by security loans rose from 24 percent to
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38 percent during that period. Banks accounted for more than
85 percent of all loans on securities made from 1919 to 1930.46
Bank investments in securities grew from US$8.4 billion to
US$13.7 billion between 1921 and 1930. Four-fifths of this growth
resulted from purchases of higher-risk issues, including state and municipal bonds, corporate bonds, and foreign securities. As a consequence, holdings of low-risk U.S. government securities declined
from 35 percent to 26 percent of bank investment portfolios during
the same period.47
Large banks also established a major presence in the securities
underwriting business. The entry of banks into the underwriting business marked the final stage in the expansion of bank securities activities during the 1920s. During the early 1900s, the Comptroller of the
Currency (the regulator of national banks) informally permitted national banks to establish bond departments so that they could compete
with the investment banking activities conducted by state-chartered
banks and trust companies. Through their bond departments, national
banks actively bought and sold bonds issued by state and local governments and by domestic corporations. The McFadden Act of 1927
ratified the legitimacy of these bond departments, because the statute
authorized national banks to buy and sell marketable debt securities.48
Neither the original National Bank Act nor the McFadden Act
allowed national banks to underwrite securities or to invest in equity
stocks.49 However, beginning in 1908 national banks circumvented
this limitation on their authority by organizing separately incorporated securities affiliates that engaged in a full range of underwriting,
distribution, and dealing activities involving both bonds and stocks.
Prior to the Great Depression, neither Congress nor federal regulators
interfered with the activities of bank securities affiliates.50
Political and economic developments encouraged banks to expand their involvement in securities underwriting and distribution
after 1920. During World War I, the federal government enlisted
banks as major participants in the selling campaigns for the government’s war bonds, known as “Liberty Loans.” More than 20 million
Americans bought Liberty bonds, and banks sold more than half of
the US$21 billion of Liberty bonds issued by the federal government.51 By participating in the Liberty bond campaigns, banks be-
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came “familiar with the technique of distributing securities [and]
gained many contacts with investors and won their confidence, partly
because of their patriotic mission, partly because they offered bonds
of unquestioned soundness.”52
One of the leaders of the Liberty bond effort, Charles Mitchell,
became president of the securities affiliate of National City Bank
(NCB) in 1916 and became president of the Bank itself in 1921.
Mitchell predicted that sales of Liberty bonds would create “a large,
new army of investors in this country who have never heretofore
known what it means to own a coupon bond and who may in the future be developed into savers and bond buyers.”53 As Mitchell expected, the successful Liberty bond campaigns helped to stimulate a
rapid growth in investor demand for corporate bonds and stocks during the economic boom of the 1920s. Politicians, economists, and financial analysts also promoted investor confidence in securities by
proclaiming that the U.S. economy had entered a new era of permanent prosperity. Belief in this “new era” was based on several factors:
The first premise of the “new economics,” as [the new era]
was otherwise called, was that the business cycle … had
been effectively abolished by the establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1913. … The Federal Reserve, with
its ability to control interest rates and conduct “open market
operations” … was hailed in the 1920s as “the remedy to the
whole problem of booms, slumps, and panics.” …
Alongside the belief in the omnipotence of the Federal Reserve, a variety of additional explanations were offered for
the endurance of the “Coolidge prosperity” which had commenced with the election of President Calvin Coolidge in
1924. … They included the extension of free trade, the decline of inflation, and a more scientific style of corporate
management. …
The relaxation of the antitrust laws during Coolidge’s
presidency allowed for a series of mergers of banking,
railroad, and utility companies that promised greater
economies of scale and more efficient production. Gains in
productivity, which rose by over 50 percent between 1919
and 1927, were ascribed to increasing investment in research
and development. …
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In 1927, John Moody, founder of the credit ratings agency,
declared that “no one can examine the panorama of business
and finance in America during the past half-dozen years
without realizing that we are living in a new era.” In April of
that year Barron’s, the investment weekly, envisaged a “new
era without depressions.” … Even Herbert Hoover’s acceptance speech in the summer of 1928, when he declared the
end of poverty to be in sight, was marked by the prevailing
“new era” optimism.54
Faith in this new era of risk-free prosperity encouraged a spectacular growth of the securities markets during the 1920s.55 A financial writer declared in 1924 that “[w]e are living in the day of the
small investor, and the small investor is the real owner of Wall
Street.”56 Commercial banks had been the primary providers of credit
to large corporations before 1920. During the 1920s, however, growing investor demand for securities permitted large corporations to reduce their borrowing from banks and to satisfy their funding needs by
selling bonds and equity stocks.57 Large firms used public offerings of
securities to finance extensive new corporate investments in plant facilities, equipment, and office buildings.58 A 1925 report by Moody’s
Investors Service noted that the “vast new buying power [of American
investors and businessmen] is almost dominating the security market
… and is seeking new avenues of expansion in all domestic industries
and in foreign fields.”59
In response to these developments, major banks expanded their
investment banking activities in order to maintain and strengthen their
relationships with retail and commercial customers. Banks sought to
increase the loyalty of their retail customers by providing investment
advice and by selling securities to their depositors and trust clients.
Banks also hoped that securities underwriting services would offset
the decline in their commercial lending business and strengthen their
business relationships with large corporations.60 Major banks therefore adopted a new strategy of “department store banking” designed
to offer “complete financial facilities” to both retail and commercial
customers.61
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From 1922 to 1929, the number of banks engaged in underwriting
securities, either through bond departments or securities affiliates,
more than doubled, rising from 277 to 591.62 In 1927, banks and their
affiliates originated 22 percent and participated in 37 percent of all
domestic and foreign bonds issued in the United States. From 1929 to
1930, banks and their affiliates originated 45 percent and participated
in more than half of all such bond issues.63 Banks were also involved
to a lesser degree in underwriting and distributing common and preferred stocks and shares of investment trusts.64
NCB and Chase National Bank (Chase), the two largest U.S.
banks, established securities affiliates with offices located across the
nation and in major foreign cities. NCB’s affiliate, National City
Company (NCC), was organized in 1911 and acquired N.W. Halsey
and Company in 1916. By 1929, NCC operated offices in more than
50 U.S. cities and several foreign cities, and NCC’s sales representatives were also posted in many of NCB’s foreign branches.65 Chase’s
affiliate, Chase Securities Corporation (CSC), was organized in 1917
and acquired Harris Forbes & Co. in 1930, thereby establishing a
similar network that included offices in more than 50 U.S. cities and
several foreign cities.66 Other large U.S. banks sought to compete by
establishing securities affiliates with interstate sales offices. Like
NCC and CSC, these affiliates often expanded by acquiring established investment banking firms.67
The Role of Banks in Promoting the Stock Market Boom
By the end of the 1920s, due to their central role in distributing
securities to the public, “commercial banks [were] by far the most
important element in the investment banking business.”68 Commercial
banks and their affiliates distributed more than half of all securities
sold in the United States during the period from 1927 to 1931, and
NCC was the largest retail distributor of securities during that period.69 From 1921 to 1929, NCC was involved, as originator or as a
syndicate participant, in selling one-fifth of all domestic and foreign
bonds issued in the United States.70
Contemporary observers concluded, and modern scholars agree,
that the securities boom of the 1920s could not have reached the same
magnitude without the involvement of large commercial banks and
their securities affiliates. For several reasons, major banks were in a

574 The Role of Universal Banks in the Boom-and-Bust Cycle of 1921–33

preferred position to establish large-scale networks for distributing
securities. Banks could easily extend loans to facilitate the sale of securities by drawing upon their deposits. In addition, banks could cultivate their close relationships with corporate issuers, and they could
mobilize a large customer base that included depositors, trust customers, and small correspondent banks.71 The securities distribution facilities of banks and their affiliates were indispensable to the
syndicate operations of the 1920s, because “the sales staffs and capital of existing private investment banking firms were not adequate to
handle the great volume of securities being issued.”72
NCC became a top securities underwriter based on the unrivaled
“placing power” provided by its retail distribution system. NCC
maintained close relationships with J.P. Morgan and Kuhn, Loeb,
which led more than half of the syndicates in which NCC participated
during the period from 1921 to 1929. The Morgan and Kuhn, Loeb
firms relied heavily on NCC’s distribution network, because they had
“no retail distribution [facilities] of their own.”73
Under Charles Mitchell’s leadership, NCC developed a highly
sophisticated program of mass advertising and direct marketing that
was carefully designed to sell securities to middle-income investors.
As already noted, NCC maintained a far-flung network of offices
staffed by hundreds of sales representatives.74 Its headquarters office
sent out a steady stream of “flashes” to its regional offices containing
investment recommendations and offers of cash prizes and other incentives for good performance by sales representatives.75 Mitchell
declared that NCC’s goal was to “spread the gospel of thrift and saving and investment” and to “bring the investment banking house to
the people in such a way that they would look upon it as a part and
parcel of their everyday life.”76
NCC also advertised extensively in national magazines. NCC’s
advertisements “assured prospective customers that if they saved, it
would advise them how to invest.”77 For example, one of NCC’s
magazine advertisements advised customers that
… the investor should not try to decide alone. He can get the
considered opinion of a world-wide investment organization—it is his for the asking. [NCC’s] judgment as to which
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bonds are best for you is based on both strict investigation of
the security and analysis of your own requirements.78
Mitchell explained to his employees that NCC’s goal was to win
the confidence of small investors and to convince them that they
should rely on NCC’s recommendations. Mitchell readily admitted
that the ordinary investor could not be expected to make informed
decisions. He therefore acknowledged that NCC owed a duty of trust
to its retail customers:
We have gained the confidence of the investor and we are
building our institution upon that confidence. We want the
public to feel safe with us. We are going to make more exacting our yard-stick, because the small investor who buys
from us today a thousand or five hundred dollar bond is not
in a position to know whether that security is good or not
and must rely on us. … [W]e recognize that as between ourselves and this small investor, the law of caveat emptor cannot apply, and that if we are to fulfill our trust, we must
supply that which means safety and a reasonable return to
him.79
Unfortunately, Mitchell’s recognition of NCC’s duty of trust to
its customers seemed to disappear whenever NCC needed to achieve
its sales objectives. In one sales flash he warned sales representatives:
I should hate to think there is any man in our sales crowd
who would confess to his inability to sell at least some of
any issue of either bonds or preferred stock that we think
good enough to offer. In fact, this would be an impossible
situation and in the interest of all concerned, one which we
would not permit to continue.80
Mitchell and NCC were successful in winning the trust of small
investors during the 1920s. By 1929, NCC was the “largest distributor
of securities in the world,” while its affiliate, NCB, was the “largest
bank in the country … and was challenging Britain’s Midland Bank
for the position of largest bank in the world.”81 Along with J.P. Morgan, Jr., Mitchell and Albert Wiggin (president of Chase) were “leading social, political, and economic figures … [who were] followed in
the newspapers like movie stars or politicians.”82 Critic Edmund Wil-
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son described Mitchell as “the banker of bankers, the salesman of
salesmen, the genius of the New Economic Era.”83
Mitchell and Wiggin viewed themselves as guardians of the stock
market, and they vigorously advocated the benefits of bank securities
affiliates. Mitchell responded aggressively when the stock market
weakened and interest rates on brokers’ call loans rose sharply in
March 1929. Market participants feared that call loans might soon be
scarce, because the Federal Reserve Board was pressuring banks not
to provide credit for speculation in the stock markets. Mitchell stabilized the stock market by publicly announcing that NCB would make
available up to US$25 million in new call loans. He declared that “we
have an obligation which is paramount to any Federal Reserve
warning, or anything else, to avert any dangerous crisis in the money
market.”84
Similarly, on October 15, 1929, Mitchell tried to reassure investors by stating publicly that “[t]he markets generally are now in a
healthy condition … [and] values have a sound basis in the general
prosperity of our country.”85 When the Great Crash began in earnest
nine days later, Mitchell, Wiggin, and other leading Wall Street bankers organized a publicly announced pool to support the stock market
by purchasing pivotal stocks. However, the bankers’ pool could not
arrest the steady slide of the stock market, and the bankers were
shown to be powerless by October 29th.86
John Kenneth Galbraith has observed that “[f]ew men ever lost
position so rapidly as did the New York bankers in the five days from
October 24 to October 29.”87 During the 1931 Senate hearings, Wiggin asserted that “[t]he whole country is stock-minded … [and] are
waiting for a rebound to-day,” but his optimism seemed hollow.88
During the same hearings, Wiggin, Mitchell, and other leading bank
executives strongly opposed Senator Glass’s proposal to separate
commercial banks from their securities affiliates. Wiggin argued that
securities affiliates provided “an essential banking service in financing the large corporations … and other clients of the banks.”89
Mitchell disputed Senator Walcott’s suggestion that securities affiliates of banks had contributed to the “increase in public credulence
[sic] or gullibility” and had helped to generate a “whirlpool of speculation” in the securities markets. Mitchell claimed that “[t]he investment bankers of the country are not the framers of public opinion.
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They must yield to the will of the investing public.”90 Mitchell’s description of Wall Street bankers as the submissive servants of public
opinion contrasted sharply with his lecture to NCC’s employees 12
years earlier, when he declared that NCC must spread “the gospel of
thrift and saving and investment” and “bring the investment banking
house to the people.”91
The public influence of Wiggin and Mitchell was already waning
in 1931 and was completely destroyed by the Pecora committee’s investigation in 1933. Mitchell and Wiggin were personally disgraced
and resigned as bank officers. NCB and Chase voluntarily decided to
divest their securities affiliates in March 1933, even before Congress
enacted the Glass-Steagall Act.92
Bank Involvement in the Securities and Credit Markets Helped to
Produce an Unsustainable Economic Boom During the 1920s
The Role of Banks in the Financing Boom
The rapid expansion of bank securities activities during the 1920s
helped to generate an unprecedented boom in the securities markets.
From 1919 to 1929, U.S. corporations issued US$49 billion of securities, including US$19.5 billion of stocks and US$29.5 billion of
bonds and notes. Annual offerings of corporate securities more than
tripled during this period, rising from US$2.7 billion in 1919 to
US$9.4 billion in 1929.93 State and local governments issued more
than US$14 billion of debt securities during the 1920s, with the majority of that amount being sold during the second half of the decade.94 Foreign governments and foreign corporations sold
US$11 billion of securities to U.S. investors between 1919 and 1929,
with the largest amounts being offered during the period 1924 to
1928.95 As indicated by these figures, all types of securities were issued in much greater volumes as banks and their affiliates expanded
their role in the securities markets during the second half of the
1920s.
The extraordinary boom in the securities markets was also manifested by dramatic increases in trading volumes and price levels. Annual trading volume on the NYSE more than quadrupled during the
1920s, rising from 230 million shares in 1920 to 1.1 billion shares in
1929.96 The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) recorded a sixfold

578 The Role of Universal Banks in the Boom-and-Bust Cycle of 1921–33

increase, rising from 64 in August 1921 to 381 in September 1929.
The price-earnings ratio for the Standard & Poor’s Composite Index
of stocks also rose by a factor of six during the 1920s and reached
32.6 in September 1929, a record that endured until the great bull
market of the 1990s reached its peak in early 2000.97
Economists have concluded that the stock market boom produced
a speculative bubble during 1928 and 1929.98 Those are the same two
years during which (1) commercial banks and their affiliates recorded
the most rapid growth in their securities underwriting and retail sales
activities, and (2) Wall Street investment banking firms responded by
selling units in hundreds of investment trusts (forerunners of today’s
mutual funds) to small investors.99 Mass-marketing techniques used
by bank securities affiliates and by investment trusts attracted large
pools of investment funds from middle-class individuals who had
largely avoided the securities markets before 1920. This huge infusion of retail investor funds produced a spectacular growth in the total
financing made available to U.S. corporations. One-third of all debt
and equity securities issued by domestic companies from 1919 to
1929 were sold during the last two years of that period. Thus, the entry of commercial banks into the securities markets triggered an intense rivalry with securities firms, resulting in an overissue of new
securities that contributed to the speculative bubble of 1928–29.100
The existence of a bubble in the securities markets is further indicated by the stunning declines in stock and bond values, and the significant increases in bond defaults, following the Crash of 1929.
Between September 1929 and July 1932, the DJIA fell from 381 to 41
and the aggregate value of all NYSE-listed stocks declined from
US$82.1 billion to US$12.7 billion.101 More than a quarter of all domestic bonds issued during the 1920s defaulted during the 1930s, and
default rates were particularly high for domestic bonds issued after
1926.102 Market values declined significantly even for those domestic
bond issues that did not default during the 1930s.103 Purchasers of
foreign bonds suffered the worst losses. More than a third of all foreign bonds sold to U.S. investors during the 1920s had defaulted by
1937, including three-quarters of all bonds sold by Eastern European
and Latin American issuers.104
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The Expansion of Bank Real Estate Loans and Consumer Credit
In addition to their rapidly growing involvement in the securities
markets, commercial banks greatly expanded their real estate lending
activities after World War I. Between 1913 and 1927, Congress
passed statutes that significantly broadened the authority of commercial banks to make loans secured by real estate.105 Bank real estate
loans more than tripled from 1919 to 1929, with most of those loans
being made in urban markets.106 The rapid growth of bank real estate
lending was part of a broader trend. Between 1919 and 1930, the total
amount of U.S. nonfarm mortgage debt rose from US$8 billion to
over US$30 billion. Banks, savings institutions, and life insurance
companies held more than US$24 billion of this debt, while the remaining US$6 billion was held in the form of real estate bonds secured by mortgages on apartment buildings and office buildings.
Commercial banks held about US$5.5 billion of real estate loans and
bonds on their balance sheets in 1930.107
The dramatic growth of real estate financing during the 1920s
fueled a spectacular real estate boom that mirrored the bull market in
securities. From 1921 to 1929, more than US$75 billion was expended on private and public construction projects, including almost
US$35 billion spent in building new housing units. Urban real estate
values doubled during the same period. Construction of detached,
one- to four-family homes declined after 1926, but construction of
new apartment buildings and office buildings continued at a rapid
pace until 1929.108 As the Senate Banking Committee observed in
1933, the “immense increase in the volumes of real-estate bond issues
and of real-estate mortgages both in banks and [other] financial institutions” created a speculative boom that resulted in many “overbuilt”
urban real estate markets by 1929.109
In addition to funds from newly issued securities and real estate
loans, a third source of new financing during the 1920s was the
growth of consumer nonmortgage credit. From 1919 to 1929,
consumer installment debt rose from US$1.9 billion to US$4.9 billion
and total consumer nonmortgage debt increased from US$2.9 billion
to US$7.6 billion. Expanded consumer credit allowed Americans to
buy vast quantities of cars, radios, phonographs, household
appliances, furniture, jewelry, and other durable consumer goods.
Postwar consumer purchases of durable goods were spurred by (1)
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pent-up demand that could not be satisfied during the economic
austerity of World War I, (2) increases in disposable income created
by a decade of prosperity, and (3) improvements in convenience and
entertainment offered by a wide range of new consumer products. For
example, car registrations rose from 11 million to 26 million between
1921 and 1929, and automobile loans were the single largest source
of consumer installment credit. Nonmortgage consumer credit was
offered to consumers by manufacturers, merchants, consumer finance
companies, and some commercial banks (including NCB). In
addition, commercial banks provided most of the indirect financing
for nonmortgage consumer credit by purchasing consumer installment
notes or by making loans to manufacturers, merchants, and finance
companies.110
The Vulnerability of the U.S. Economy to a Severe Economic
Downturn in 1929
As shown in the preceding section, commercial banks participated
in the financing boom of the 1920s through five different channels—
loans on securities, securities investments, public offerings of
securities, real estate lending, and consumer credit. The financing
boom of the 1920s created two conditions that contributed to the
onset and severity of the Great Depression. First, abundant credit
allowed both the private and public sectors to assume heavy debt
burdens, resulting in a national economy that was extremely fragile at
the end of the 1920s. By 1929, total private and public debt probably
exceeded US$200 billion, with more than 80 percent of that amount
being owed by private firms and individuals. This aggregate debt
burden was more than double the nation’s total annual income of
US$87 billion. Total debt service as a percentage of gross domestic
product (GDP) rose to 9 percent for the United States in 1929,
compared to only 3.9 percent for Canada.111 This highly leveraged
situation exposed consumers, state and local governments, and
business firms to devastating financial shocks during the Great
Depression.112
Second, the explosion of debt and equity finance during the 1920s
encouraged excessive investments in real estate, industrial plant and
equipment, and public facilities. From 1921 to 1929, almost
US$35 billion was invested in new housing, US$55 billion was spent
for new plant facilities and equipment, and at least US$10 billion was
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expended by public agencies for roads, schools, and public utilities.113
Industrial production increased by 40 percent from 1922 to 1929, reflecting large investments in new manufacturing facilities.114
Many of the housing subdivisions, apartment buildings, and office buildings constructed during the 1920s proved to be poorly
planned and economically unviable when the real estate boom
ended.115 Similarly, much of the new investment in plant and equipment was committed to speculative and ultimately unsuccessful ventures. Many high-flying companies of the 1920s were relatively
young firms, which tried to exploit new technologies that had captured the imagination of Wall Street bankers and individual investors.
The most fashionable and speculative stocks of the 1920s were issued
by companies involved with aircraft, automobiles, chemicals, electrical equipment and appliances, electrical utilities, motion pictures,
phonographs, radios, and retail stores. Du Pont, Fox Films, General
Electric, General Motors, Montgomery Ward, Radio Corporation of
America, RKO, United Aircraft and Transport, and Westinghouse
were notable examples of the glamour stocks of the 1920s.116
Many younger firms in high-tech businesses failed during the
1920s or subsequently during the Depression, resulting in significant
losses in both investment value and productivity. Those failures were
consistent with a typical pattern of industrial development in which
(1) numerous firms enter a new field with plans to exploit an emerging technology; (2) a highly competitive shakeout period ensues, resulting in the failure or absorption of most entrants; and (3) the
industry evolves into a more stable oligopoly dominated by a few
leading firms.117 For example, despite the tremendous increase in
automobile production and sales during the 1920s, the number of car
manufacturers declined from 104 to 30 and the number of automobile
tire producers fell from 274 to 93 during the same decade.118 Similarly, Wall Street bankers and investors poured too much financing
into radio, motion pictures, and other high-tech industries based on
unrealistic expectations of how quickly those fields would produce
steady growth and solid profits.119 Markets for automobiles, radios,
and other high-tech goods were saturated by the end of the 1920s, as
indicated by the rapid growth of business inventories during 1929.120
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The stock market bubble of 1928–29 produced a final burst of
new investment funds for the U.S. economy. U.S. corporations issued
US$16.3 billion of bonds and stocks during those two years, accounting for one-third of all domestic corporate securities issued between
1919 and 1929. As previously noted, bank securities affiliates and
investment trusts were instrumental in finding purchasers to absorb
this huge volume of new securities.121 The final stage of the stock
market boom encouraged many business firms to make speculative
investments in commercial real estate and industrial facilities. Construction of apartment buildings, office buildings, and plant facilities
rose sharply in 1928–29, along with investments in business equipment and inventories. It appears that the financing surge of 1928–29
induced firm managers to make costly new investments based on their
expectation that demand would continue to grow in line with the
boom years of 1924–28.122
Unfortunately, the rosy expectations fueled by the stock market
bubble proved to be unfounded. The U.S. economy began to weaken
in the summer of 1929, as both construction activity and automobile
production declined.123 Consumption of durable goods by consumers
plummeted following the crash of 1929, leading to a sharp drop in
business investments in plant, equipment, and inventories. As a consequence, GDP declined by 10 percent and industrial output fell by
21 percent during the period 1929–30.124 In view of the rapid declines
in consumer consumption, industrial output, and business investment
of 1929–30, it seems clear that the crash of 1929 triggered a severe
economic downturn by (1) destroying investor wealth; (2) creating
uncertainty among investors, consumers, and business managers; and
(3) disrupting the stock market’s ability to serve as a channel for continued financing.125
To sum up, commercial banks were leading participants in the
expansion of debt and equity financing during the 1920s. The surge
of new financing fueled a speculative economic boom that encouraged consumers and business firms to assume heavy debt burdens and
to make speculative investments. The boom left the U.S. economy in
an extremely fragile condition at the end of 1929.126
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Commercial banks and other financial institutions were not solely
responsible for the boom-and-bust cycle of 1921–33. The Federal
Reserve’s decisions on monetary policy played a major role in both
the boom and the collapse. A detailed analysis of the Federal Reserve’s actions during 1921–33 is beyond the scope of the present
discussion. However, I will note three aspects of the Federal Reserve’s policy that have been heavily criticized by both contemporary
and modern scholars.
First, the Federal Reserve adopted “easy-money” policies in 1924
and 1927, thereby encouraging the financing boom that continued
through late 1929. In 1924 and again in 1927, the Federal Reserve cut
the discount rate and purchased large amounts of government securities. Both episodes were motivated by domestic and foreign considerations. The Federal Reserve wanted to reduce interest rates to
counteract mild downturns in the U.S. economy that occurred in 1924
and 1927. In addition, the Federal Reserve wanted to help the United
Kingdom, France, and Germany in their efforts to reestablish the gold
standard in 1924–25, and to preserve the gold standard in 1927. By
producing easier credit conditions, the Federal Reserve’s policy actions in 1924 and 1927 supported the securities markets and helped to
extend the nation’s economic prosperity. Unfortunately, the Federal
Reserve’s actions also encouraged speculative behavior. The Federal
Reserve’s apparent ability to fine-tune the economy and sustain the
postwar boom led many financial institutions, investors, and business
firms to believe that the business cycle had been tamed.127
The Federal Reserve’s second error was to pursue an overly restrictive monetary policy in 1928–29. The Federal Reserve wanted to
curb excessive speculation in the securities markets, but its actions
had the unintended effect of increasing the real cost of credit for the
general economy. Tight credit conditions, particularly in view of the
continuing demand by investors for security loans, precipitated a
sharp economic downturn in the summer of 1929.128
The Federal Reserve’s third (and most fateful) mistake was that it
failed to counteract the destabilizing effects of a series of regional
banking panics, which began in late 1930 and culminated in the nationwide banking holiday of March 1933. The banking panics produced a severe contraction in the nation’s money supply by freezing
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the deposits held by failed banks and by encouraging depositors in
open banks to convert their deposits into currency. Bank failures also
depressed economic activity by disrupting the flow of credit to businesses, especially small and medium-sized firms that could not obtain
financing through the securities markets. The Federal Reserve failed
to make sustained, large-scale purchases of government securities and
bank acceptances in order to offset declines in the nation’s money
supply. In addition, the Federal Reserve did not act as lender of last
resort for the banking system. Many economists believe that the Federal Reserve’s failure to respond to the progressive collapse of the
banking system turned the sharp recession of 1929–30 into the Great
Depression of 1931–33.129
The Federal Reserve’s policy mistakes were important factors
that help to explain the intensity of the speculative boom of the 1920s
and the severity of the economic collapse of the early 1930s. Senator
Glass himself assigned much of the blame to the Federal Reserve.130
At the same time, there is substantial support for Glass’s claim that
banks and their securities affiliates bore significant responsibility for
the boom-and-bust cycle of 1921–33. Contemporary scholars and
members of Congress pointed out that banks and their affiliates
played key roles in arranging the debt and equity financing that fueled
the economic boom of the 1920s. Contemporary observers also
stressed the linkage between the abundant financing of the 1920s and
the leverage and overinvestment that aggravated the economic collapse of the 1930s.131
Two recent studies provide additional evidence supporting Senator Glass’s view. Eichengreen and Mitchener documented the existence of a credit boom in the United States and several other countries
during the second half of the 1920s. They also determined that this
credit boom contributed to the economic slump of the 1930s, particularly in nations (like the United States) in which the credit boom was
accompanied by a stock market boom.132
Cole, Ohanian, and Leung found that productivity shocks accounted for about two-thirds of the output changes in 17 countries
during 1929–33, while monetary/deflation shocks accounted for the
remaining third. Consequently, they concluded that productivity
shocks were more important than monetary factors in explaining the
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collapse of economic output during the Great Depression. They also
determined that productivity shocks during 1929–33 were linked to
industrial activity and were expected by stock market investors to
persist throughout the period. Finally, they found some support for
the view that productivity shocks were correlated with financial market shocks, including banking panics.133 The findings of both studies
are broadly consistent with the understanding of Glass and his supporters. As discussed earlier, Glass and his colleagues maintained that
excessive debt and equity financing during the 1920s generated overinvestment and economic fragility, resulting in a collapse of economic output when the sources of that financing were disrupted by
the Crash of 1929.

A Preliminary Reconsideration of the Modern Critique of
the Glass-Steagall Act
Beginning in the 1980s, a number of scholars have argued that the
Glass-Steagall Act was an ill-conceived law from the outset. These
critics have raised three principal points. First, they contend that the
Glass-Steagall Act was self-interested legislation that was promoted
by traditional investment banks in order to expel commercial banks
from the securities underwriting business. Second, they maintain that
banks with securities affiliates were safer institutions and were more
likely to survive the banking panics of the 1930s, in comparison with
specialized commercial banks. Third, they contend that Congress was
largely mistaken in its belief that universal banks had endangered the
public interest through abusive selling practices and other conflicts of
interest.
As to the first issue, I find no evidence indicating that investment
banks were either supporters or intended beneficiaries of the
Glass-Steagall Act. Regarding the second and third issues, I offer preliminary responses indicating that Congress had substantial reasons to
believe that universal banks presented serious risks to the banking
system and the broader economy.
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Were Traditional Securities Firms Supporters or Intended
Beneficiaries of the Glass-Steagall Act?
Several scholars have advanced an “interest group” explanation
for the Glass-Steagall Act. They contend that traditional investment
banks encouraged Congress to adopt the 1933 legislation in order to
remove their commercial banking rivals from the securities underwriting business.134 It is certainly true that, from the mid-1960s through
the end of the 1980s, securities firms and their trade associations
fought hard to maintain the wall of separation created by the
Glass-Steagall Act. It was not until the early 1990s that leading securities firms decided to support universal banking legislation, after failing to overturn federal agency rulings that opened major loopholes in
the Glass-Steagall Act.135
Notwithstanding the securities firms’ modern defense of the
Glass-Steagall barriers, the available evidence does not show that traditional investment banks were supporters or intended beneficiaries of
the Act. Jonathan Macey, a proponent of the “interest group” explanation for Glass-Steagall, has acknowledged that “few hints of such favoritism can be gleaned from the legislative history or from the
statutory language itself.”136 Indeed, the “interest group” theory does
not square with the known facts about the 1933 legislation.
The Investment Bankers Association of America (IBA), the leading trade association representing securities firms, actively opposed
the legislation. During congressional hearings on the Glass bill in
1932, Allan Pope, president of the IBA, strongly condemned the provisions requiring commercial banks to leave the business of investment banking. Pope testified that he had met with “several hundred
members” of the IBA in a dozen major cities, and “without a single
exception” all those members opposed the Glass bill.137 Pope argued
that a mandatory separation between commercial and investment
banking would be “highly deflationary” and would “practically stop
the security and industrial business of the country.”138 He further declared that the Glass bill was “so highly detrimental to the investment
market to-day as to unquestionably affect in a ruinous manner the
banks throughout the country as well as investment banks.”139
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Pope’s testimony portrayed the IBA’s membership as being
firmly united in opposition to the Glass bill. It could be argued that
Pope’s testimony is not conclusive on this point. As Donald
Langevoort has noted, “control of the [IBA] … had fallen to the commercial bankers” by 1930.140 Pope himself was executive vice president of the securities affiliate of the First National Bank of Boston.141
Accordingly, Pope might have been inclined to exaggerate the degree
of consensus among the IBA’s members in opposing the Glass bill.
However, no investment bank testified in favor of the Glass bill, a
fact that tends to support Pope’s claim that the IBA’s membership
universally opposed the bill.
Edwin Perkins has drawn the opposite inference from the absence
of any traditional investment bankers among the list of witnesses who
testified at the 1931 and 1932 Senate hearings on the Glass bill. From
this absence, Perkins inferred that “older investment banking houses
who had been losing the competitive battle with the more aggressive
commercial banks now thought they saw an opportunity to reestablish
their former dominant position in the underwriting field” by supporting the Glass bill.142 This inference is contradicted, however, by the
fact that leading partners of J.P. Morgan, the foremost private investment bank, strongly opposed the Glass-Steagall Act in their private
dealings.143 For example, during the summer of 1932, Russell Leffingwell, a Morgan partner with close personal connections to Franklin Roosevelt and the Democratic Party, wrote a personal letter urging
Roosevelt to reject the Glass bill. Leffingwell argued that “we cannot
cure the present deflation and depression” with the “prohibition and
regulation stuff” proposed by Glass. Roosevelt, however, rebuffed
Leffingwell’s entreaty. Roosevelt declared that bankers were responsible for “grave abuses” during the period 1927–29, and it was therefore imperative for honorable bankers to “support wholeheartedly
methods to prevent recurrence thereof.”144 Roosevelt subsequently
made a campaign speech in which he urged the complete separation
of commercial and investment banking.145
J.P. Morgan’s opposition to Glass-Steagall is further indicated by
its decision in 1935 to abandon the securities business and remain a
deposit-taking bank. Drexel & Co. (Morgan’s affiliate in Philadelphia) and Brown Brothers Harriman (another leading private investment bank) made the same choice. Several partners from J.P. Morgan
and Drexel resigned to form Morgan Stanley, a new investment bank-
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ing firm. J.P. Morgan provided most of the initial financing for Morgan Stanley. During the early years of Morgan Stanley’s operation,
partners in the two firms maintained close relations, and they clearly
hoped that Congress would amend or repeal Glass-Steagall so that
they could once again operate as a single firm. Other traditional investment banks—including Kuhn, Loeb; Lazard Freres; and Lehman
Brothers—opted to become securities firms. As indicated by these
varying responses to the Glass-Steagall Act, it was doubtful whether
traditional investment banks would actually benefit from the legislation, given (1) the heavily depressed condition of the securities markets during the early 1930s, and (2) Section 21 of the Act, which
prohibited securities firms from accepting deposits.146
Another problem with the “interest group” explanation of
Glass-Steagall is that the Senate’s investigation of Wall Street practices during 1932 and 1933 did not spare traditional investment
banks. As discussed below, the Pecora committee’s investigation in
1933 was particularly harsh toward NCC and Chase and their securities affiliates. However, the Senate’s investigation also revealed
highly unfavorable information about traditional securities firms, including (1) Halsey, Stuart’s role in aggressively marketing securities
issued by the Insull utility empire prior to its bankruptcy in 1932;
(2) Lee, Higginson’s similar promotion of securities issued by Ivan
Kreuger’s companies before they collapsed in 1932; (3) Goldman
Sachs’ sponsorship of Goldman Sachs Trading Corporation, a highly
leveraged investment trust whose shares became worthless by 1933;
(4) J.P. Morgan’s similarly ill-fated sponsorship of three large investment trusts, and its practice of allocating shares of newly underwritten securities to “preferred lists” of influential politicians and
businessmen at heavily discounted prices; and (5) Kuhn, Loeb’s and
Dillon Read’s promotion of several investment trusts that inflicted
large losses on ordinary investors.147
As a consequence of the Senate’s investigation, journalists
harshly criticized J.P. Morgan and other private investment banks,
and the public’s reaction against investment banks was “almost as
condemnatory” as the outcry against NCB, Chase and their affiliates.
Public attacks on investment banks helped to persuade Congress to
enact the Securities Act of 1933 despite the lobbying efforts of Wall
Street bankers.148 Hostility to investment banks also surfaced in Section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act, which prohibited any person or firm
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from accepting deposits if they engaged in the business of underwriting, selling, or distributing securities.149
During the Senate debates on the Glass-Steagall Act, Senator
Tydings of Maryland offered an amendment to Section 21. The
Tydings amendment would have exempted investment banks from the
prohibition on deposit taking if they satisfied certain safeguards.
Tydings declared that he was in favor of separating commercial banks
from the securities business. However, he argued, “private investment
houses of the better class” (such as his constituent, Alexander Brown
& Sons of Baltimore) performed a vital public service in “financing
private businesses … on long-term paper.” He warned the Senate that
Section 21 would impair the availability of credit by undermining
“the usefulness of bona fide, finely run and conducted private
institutions.”150
Senators Bulkley and Glass strongly opposed the Tydings amendment and persuaded the Senate to reject the amendment. Bulkley declared that an absolute prohibition on deposit taking by securities
firms was “vital to the principles” of the Glass-Steagall Act. Glass
agreed that this prohibition was a “vital provision of the bill,” because
it would “confine to their proper business activities these large private
concerns” and would “deny them the right to conduct the deposit
bank business.” Glass reminded the Senate that private investment
banks had “unloaded millions of dollars of worthless investment securities upon the banks of this country.” He also predicted that “there
will be no difficulty … in financing any business enterprise that needs
to be financed at a profit in this country [because] large investment
houses will be set up in this country, just as they have been in all of
the countries of continental Europe, and in England.” In fact, Glass
noted, officials of Chase’s securities affiliate were already taking
steps to reorganize the affiliate as a separate investment bank.151
The public legislative history of Section 21, including the Senate’s defeat of the Tydings amendment, supports the view that the
Glass-Steagall Act was designed to carry out a complete separation of
the commercial and investment banking businesses. That history
strongly undercuts the view that Glass and his supporters sought to
protect securities firms from competition by commercial banks. Section 21 “severely hurt the private bankers” who chose to become se-
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curities firms, because it deprived them of an important source of
funding (i.e., deposits) and made them more dependent on loans from
commercial banks.152 The successful opposition of Glass and Bulkley
to the Tydings amendment clearly indicated that investment banks
were not intended beneficiaries of the Glass-Steagall Act.153
As Donald Langevoort has observed, the provisions and history
of the Glass-Steagall Act demonstrate that the legislation had a “channeling objective”—to confine banks to “the traditional business of
commercial and agricultural lending” and to prevent bank deposits
from being used to fund loans for speculative purposes.154 The available evidence—particularly with regard to Section 21—contradicts
any inference that the Act was designed to favor securities firms.
Glass’s conduct two years later further undermines any such inference. Glass tried to include a provision in the Banking Act of 1935
that would have given commercial banks a limited authority to underwrite and sell debt securities (but not equity stocks). Under Glass’s
proposal, commercial banks could have underwritten or sold debt securities to dealers or brokers (other than banks), or at public auction,
under rules established by the Comptroller of the Currency. Glass
argued that commercial banks should be granted a carefully limited
power to sell debt securities because securities firms were not providing adequate long-term financing to industrial corporations.155 Since
Glass’s proposal would have allowed commercial banks to make a
partial reentry into the securities underwriting business, it certainly
did not reflect any desire to protect securities firms. Indeed, Glass
explained that he was disappointed by the poor performance of securities firms in arranging long-term financing for industrial firms, contrary to his optimistic expectations in 1933.156
The Senate adopted Glass’s proposal over the vocal opposition of
Senator Robert LaFollette. In opposing Glass, LaFollette did not express any solicitude for securities firms. Instead, he reiterated the
same arguments advanced in 1933 in favor of “a complete divorcement and separation between investment and commercial banking in
this country.” LaFollette declared that “the underwriting and sale of
securities by commercial banks … served to wipe out the reserves and
the savings of a lifetime which millions in this country had accumulated.” In LaFollette’s view, “the whole experience of the investing
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public and of the people of the United States during the boom and the
depression proves that [Glass’s] proposal is loaded with dynamite as
far as the investing public in the future is concerned.”157 Glass’s proposal was opposed by the Roosevelt Administration and was omitted
from the conference report on the 1935 legislation.158 Thus, as in the
case of the Glass-Steagall Act, the debates on Glass’s proposal in
1935 did not indicate any congressional purpose to protect securities
firms from competition.
Did Securities Activities Threaten the Safety of Banks During the
1930s?
George Benston has concluded that “[t]he evidence from the
pre-Glass-Steagall period is totally inconsistent with the belief that
banks’ securities activities or investments caused them to fail or otherwise caused the financial system to collapse.”159 Benston relied extensively on a study by Eugene White, who found that “[f]ew banks
with [securities] affiliates failed; and even though Congressional hearings may have uncovered some problems, the securities affiliates did
not systematically undermine the capital or liquidity provisions of
national banks.”160 White determined that 26.3 percent of all national
banks failed during the period 1930–33, compared with only
6.5 percent of banks with securities affiliates and only 7.6 percent of
banks with large bond departments. White noted, however, that “the
typical bank involved in investment banking was far larger than average, while most of the failures were among the smaller institutions.”161 Larger banks had a higher probability of survival during the
Great Depression, because (1) their assets were more diversified in
comparison to smaller banks, and (2) they were more likely to receive
financial support from other banks and the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation (RFC). Due to the higher survival rate for large banks,
depositors shifted their funds from smaller banks to larger banks during the banking panics of 1930–33.162 Consequently, White’s data on
bank survival do not permit us to separate the impact of securities
activities from the positive effect of larger size.
White also performed regressions based on data for bank failures
during 1931. He concluded that, during that year, the presence of a
securities affiliate “tended to reduce the likelihood of failure” while
the presence of a bond department “did not increase the probability of
failure.” Again, however, White’s regression analysis is not conclu-
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sive, because his sample did not enable him to measure the impact of
differences in bank size. In addition, White did not consider the significance of specific incidents in which major banks with securities
affiliates failed during 1930, 1932, and 1933.163
One problem in isolating the effect of securities activities on bank
failures is that banks failed for various reasons during the Great Depression. It appears, however, that losses from defaulted real estate
loans and depreciated securities investments were two of the most
important causes of bank failures from 1930 to 1933. As described
above, real estate lending and investments in higher-risk securities
were two leading sources for the financing surge of the 1920s. Both
activities required banks to invest in assets that were subject to potential liquidity problems, and both markets experienced speculative
booms during the 1920s. It is therefore not surprising that both activities proved to be serious threats to bank solvency during the early
1930s.
Default rates rose rapidly for both residential and commercial
mortgages and reached crisis proportions in 1931–32. Real estate values in many urban areas fell by a third or more in 1929–31, and a
large number of urban real estate markets were essentially frozen by
1932. Banks often could not liquidate defaulted loans by foreclosing
on the real estate collateral, because no buyers were available to pay
any reasonable price for the property. The illiquid status of defaulted
real estate loans was a significant factor explaining the loss of bank
capital during the 1930s.164
Many banks were also devastated by depreciation in their
securities portfolios. As noted above, both domestic and foreign
bonds experienced sharp increases in default rates and rapid declines
in market values from 1931 to 1933.165 Losses on South American
and Eastern European bonds were especially severe, as three-quarters
of those bonds defaulted during the 1930s.166 An analysis of closed
New York state banks found that their securities portfolios had
suffered an average loss in market value of 37.5 percent. A similar
study of closed Michigan banks determined that depreciation in their
bond portfolios (particularly with regard to real estate bonds) was a
primary reason for their failure.167 From 1929 to 1932, the losses
suffered by national and state member banks on securities
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investments were comparable in magnitude to their losses on loans.168
A recent study by Calomiris and Mason confirms that defaulted real
estate loans and depreciated securities were important causes of bank
failures.169
Smaller banks suffered the greatest percentage losses from securities investments, because higher-risk securities represented a higher
proportion of their investment portfolios. Among Federal Reserve
member banks, country banks held larger amounts of foreign bonds
and railroad bonds than reserve city banks did.170 Some commentators
blamed country bankers for their lack of prudence in pursuing higher
yields without regard to risk.171 However, members of Congress and
other commentators strongly criticized securities affiliates of commercial banks and traditional investment banks for aggressive marketing campaigns that encouraged unsophisticated country bankers to
buy risky securities.172 Country banks relied heavily on their correspondent banks in major cities for a wide range of banking services,
including investment advice and the sale of investment securities.173
Allan Pope, executive vice president of First National Bank of Boston’s securities affiliate, acknowledged in 1931 that country bankers
sought his company’s investment advice because they were “unfamiliar with the investment markets.”174 In 1932, he testified that 600
country banks relied on his affiliate for investment recommendations,
“based on our broad expanse of knowledge.” According to Pope,
some country bankers had been specifically instructed by bank examiners to “take our advice in security matters.”175
Thus, it appears that bank securities affiliates contributed to the
failure of many small correspondent banks by persuading them to invest in high-risk bonds, particularly foreign issues. The linkage between bank securities activities and bank failures is a worthwhile
subject for future research, but for present purposes, I will simply
note the following evidence indicating that bank securities affiliates
did create significant risks for large banks and the banking system
from 1930 to 1933.
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The Failures of Several Key Banks with Securities Affiliates
Between 1930 and 1933, the failures or near-failures of several
key banking organizations resulted, at least in part, from their involvement in securities activities. In 1930, Caldwell and Company
and Bank of United States failed. Those failures precipitated the first
banking crisis of the Great Depression. In 1932, the RFC was forced
to provide large loans in order to (1) protect the depositors of Central
Republic Bank and (2) ensure the survival of Bank of America. In
1933, the failure of four important banks with securities affiliates—
two in Detroit and two in Cleveland—precipitated statewide banking
holidays that helped to trigger a nationwide banking panic.
Caldwell and Company and Bank of United States
Caldwell and Company (CAC) established a large financial and
industrial empire that covered much of the Southeast. CAC was a
leading underwriter of municipal bonds, industrial revenue bonds, and
real estate bonds throughout the Southern states. By the end of 1929,
CAC controlled a large chain of banks with more than US$210 million of assets, insurance companies with more than US$230 million of
assets, and newspapers and industrial companies with almost US$50
million of assets. In early 1930, CAC merged with BancoKentucky
Company, which controlled 10 banks with assets of almost US$140
million.176
CAC obtained extensive loans from its bank affiliates, as well as
other banks in the Southeast. CAC aggressively speculated in stocks
on Wall Street. CAC also held large amounts of illiquid securities
representing investments in its affiliates and unsold securities from its
underwritten offerings.177 CAC’s entire financial structure was unsound and collapsed in November 1930. CAC’s demise precipitated
the failure of more than 130 banks in Arkansas, Kentucky, North
Carolina, and Tennessee, thereby inflicting a severe economic shock
on the Southeast’s regional economy.178
Bank of United States (BUS) was a New York City bank that expanded rapidly during the late 1920s by acquiring five other banks.
By May 1929, BUS had 57 branches, US$315 million of assets, and
US$220 million of deposits. BUS controlled three securities affiliates,
three safe deposit companies, an insurance company, and dozens of
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real estate affiliates.179 BUS and its real estate affiliates made large
loans to real estate developers and invested in real estate bonds. BUS
also made substantial loans to its officers and securities affiliates for
the purpose of financing continuous trading in units consisting of
BUS stock joined with the stock of its major securities affiliate. By
1930, BUS had committed US$16 million (equal to one-third of its
capital) to support the price of its stock units. BUS was strongly motivated to maintain the price of its stock units, because BUS had
agreed to repurchase those units at a guaranteed price from many of
its shareholders, including depositors to whom BUS had actively
marketed the units.180
BUS was doomed when the real estate and stock markets slumped
after the Crash of 1929. At the time of its failure in December 1930,
BUS had outstanding more than US$20 million of unpaid loans to its
securities and real estate affiliates, as well as US$11 million of unpaid
loans to its officers and other persons that were collateralized by its
stock units. BUS’s affiliates incurred a loss of at least US$16 million
on their holdings of BUS stock units. Large amounts of BUS’s real
estate loans and bonds were either in default or likely to default.181
BUS failed after the New York state banking department and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York could not persuade members of the
New York Clearing House Association (NYCHA) to provide support
for an emergency merger of BUS with two other New York City
banks.182 BUS’s failure led to the collapse of Chelsea Bank, a smaller
New York City Bank that was closely connected with BUS. Depositor
runs began at two larger banks—Manufacturers Trust and Public National—that were also linked with BUS. Members of the NYCHA
intervened to rescue those banks and avert a more widespread banking panic.183
Scholars have debated whether BUS’s failure aggravated the economic decline that was already under way in the United States. Regardless of its direct economic impact, there can be little doubt that
BUS’s failure had a significantly adverse impact on public confidence
in banks. BUS ranked among the 30 largest commercial banks in the
nation, and it was the largest single bank failure in U.S. history up to
that time. Both domestic and international newspapers gave extensive
coverage to BUS’s failure, because of its name and its membership in
the Federal Reserve System. Together with the collapse of CAC, the
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failure of BUS produced a substantial outflow of currency from the
banking system as depositors converted their deposits into cash. That
outflow indicated a significant loss of confidence in the U.S. banking
system.184
The Chicago Banking Panics and Central Republic
In June 1931, a serious banking panic occurred in Chicago. During Chicago’s real estate boom of the mid-1920s, the city’s banks expanded rapidly and devoted much of their resources to real estate
lending. As the result of numerous mergers, two giant banks—
Continental Illinois Bank and Trust Company (Continental Illinois)
and First National Bank of Chicago (First Chicago) controlled
two-thirds of Chicago’s banking resources by 1931. Many of the larger Chicago banks and their securities affiliates sold real estate bonds
to investors with an explicit or implicit undertaking to repurchase the
bonds upon request. Chicago banks and their securities affiliates distributed other types of securities, including municipal bonds and
bonds issued by Samuel Insull’s utility empire. Banks and their affiliates were also exposed to the securities markets as a consequence of
their investment securities and security loans.185
Given their heavy involvement in real estate activities, many
Chicago banks became highly vulnerable after the city’s real estate
boom ended in 1928. By June 1931, a chain of banks controlled by
the Foreman State Bank was faced with imminent depositor runs,
because Foreman could no longer repurchase real estate bonds that its
securities affiliate sold to depositors. To avoid the collapse of the
entire Foreman chain, First Chicago agreed to acquire most of the
Foreman banks with financial help from the Chicago Clearing House
Association (CCHA). In addition, the National Bank of the Republic,
which had been weakened by its own real estate problems, agreed to
merge with Central Trust Company to form the Central Republic
Bank and Trust Company (Central Republic). However, these
measures did not prevent the demise of a chain of 12 banks controlled
by John Bain, an aggressive real estate promoter. The Bain default
was accompanied by the failures of another 20 banks. A full-scale
panic was averted only when First Chicago and Continental Illinois
publicly announced that they would support all of their local
correspondent banks. The panic ended, but the resolution proved to be
temporary.186
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In the summer of 1932, another and more serious banking panic
struck Chicago. The real estate situation in Chicago had grown worse,
and more than US$1 billion of mortgages were in default. Chicago’s
economy was also shaken by the collapse of the highly leveraged Insull utility system in the spring of 1932. Samuel Insull’s holding
companies, headquartered in Chicago, controlled a network of public
utility companies serving more than 5,000 communities in 36 states.
Insull and his investment bankers, led by the Chicago firm of Halsey,
Stuart, had promoted the sale of Insull holding company securities to
small investors. The securities affiliates of First Chicago, Continental
Illinois, and Central Republic had participated in the distribution of
Insull securities to the public, and they also invested in Insull securities. By the time the Insull holding companies were declared bankrupt
in 1932, US$2.65 billion of Insull securities had been sold to 600,000
shareholders and 500,000 bondholders. Chicago banks extended more
than US$150 million of loans to Insull companies and to other borrowers who offered Insull securities as collateral. Insull interests
owed US$90 million to the three leading banks, with Continental Illinois holding two-thirds of those loans. The Insull debacle thus wiped
out the personal savings of thousands of Chicago area residents and
threatened the solvency of many Chicago banks.187 In addition, the
Chicago city government was facing its own revenue crisis and could
not pay its employees or bondholders.188
In this atmosphere of deepening economic crisis, Chicago
residents lost faith in their banks. Thirty-six banks in Chicago failed
between June 15 and 25, 1932. In sharp contrast to the 1931 panic,
legions of frightened depositors descended on the three leading
Chicago banks. Continental Illinois and First Chicago withstood the
temporary panic among their depositors. In a dramatic gesture,
Melvin Traylor, First Chicago’s chairman, climbed on a pillar in the
bank’s lobby and persuaded a crowd of worried depositors to remain
calm. Central Republic, however, could not withstand the pressure of
escalating deposit withdrawals. On June 26th, Charles Dawes,
chairman of Central Republic, informed Chicago’s banking leaders
and officials of the recently established RFC that he would have to
close his bank unless a rescue plan was arranged to protect all of its
depositors.189
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In contrast to their successful self-help plan in 1931, Continental
Illinois, First Chicago, and the CCHA could not finance the rescue of
Central Republic. Chicago’s banking leaders and RFC examiners determined that Central Republic needed an infusion of US$95 million
to remain open. The Chicago banks told the RFC that they could only
offer US$5 million in loans, thus revealing their gravely weakened
condition. With the encouragement of President Hoover, the RFC
determined that Central Republic must be rescued, because the bank’s
failure would lead to depositor runs on Chicago’s remaining banks
and a likely collapse of the entire U.S. banking system. In practical
effect, the RFC treated Central Republic as being “too big to fail.”
Accordingly, the RFC agreed to provide a US$90 million loan, secured by all of Central Republic’s assets. The RFC’s loan allowed
Central Republic to continue in operation temporarily, but the bank
could not survive. The 5½ percent interest rate charged by the RFC
substantially exceeded the bank’s return on its assets. In October
1932, Central Republic transferred all of its deposits to a newly organized bank, and Central Republic was liquidated thereafter.190
The RFC’s protection of Central Republic’s depositors temporarily calmed financial markets in Chicago and the nation. However, the
incident revealed four very unpleasant facts about the nation’s banking situation in mid-1932. First, bank failures, which had previously
been confined to smaller and midsized banks (except for CAC and
BUS), were spreading to large urban banks. Second, the most vulnerable urban banks were those that had engaged in extensive real estate
and securities activities during the 1920s. Third, even the largest urban banks no longer had the resources to resolve serious banking panics without governmental assistance. Fourth, RFC loans provided
only short-term relief and could not solve the fundamental problems
confronting banks. The RFC required banks to pledge their best assets
to secure 100 percent of the loans they received. RFC loans were
made at penalty interest rates and could not exceed the estimated
market or liquidation value of the banks’ collateral. RFC loans also
became a potential trigger for depositor runs after Congress required
publication of the names of banks receiving RFC loans. For all these
reasons, RFC loans failed to prevent a progressive collapse of the
banking system during 1932 and 1933.191
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Threats to the Survival of Bank of America
Bank of America, like other urban banks, expanded rapidly
through mergers and acquisitions during the boom years of the 1920s.
By 1930, Transamerica Corp., the parent holding company of Bank of
America, was the third largest U.S. banking organization, trailing
only Chase and NCB. Transamerica controlled more than 400 bank
branches and US$1.2 billion of banking assets in California, as well
as a New York City bank with 35 branches and US$400 million of
assets. Transamerica also acquired a Wall Street securities firm,
Bancamerica-Blair Corporation, which operated offices in 27 U.S.
cities and 5 foreign countries.192 Transamerica and Bancamerica-Blair
financed substantial stock-trading operations designed to support
Transamerica’s stock price. Both companies also actively invested in
other stocks, and Bancamerica-Blair was a major distributor of
securities to retail customers.193
By 1931, Bank of America and Transamerica found themselves in
great difficulty. Bank of America was rapidly losing deposits, and
many of its residential and commercial real estate loans were in
default or danger of default. Transamerica and Bancamerica-Blair
suffered large losses on their stock investments and loans on
securities. Elisha Walker, the recently elected chairman of
Transamerica, decided to retrench. He engineered the sale of the New
York City bank and Bancamerica-Blair to NCB in October 1931.
Walker completed this transaction over the strenuous opposition of
A.P. Giannini, the founder and former chairman of Bank of America
and Transamerica.194
A fight for corporate control ensued. Giannini prevailed in a
proxy contest and regained control of Transamerica in February 1932.
The RFC immediately offered to provide up to US$100 million of
credit to support Giannini’s rehabilitation plan for Bank of America.
The RFC ultimately loaned US$65 million to Bank of America and
Transamerica, thereby helping Giannini to rebuild Bank of America.195 As in the case of Central Republic, the RFC determined that
Bank of America’s survival was crucial to the stability of the U.S.
banking system. The RFC made US$1.1 billion of loans to help banks
between February 1932 and March 1933. Of that amount, US$155
million, or 14 percent, was devoted to the support of Central Republic
and Bank of America.196
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Major Bank Failures in Detroit and Cleveland in 1933
During the late 1920s, two major bank holding companies were
created in Michigan through a series of mergers and acquisitions—the
Detroit Bankers Company (Detroit Bankers) and the Guardian Detroit
Union Group (Guardian). By 1931, both groups owned banks
throughout the state of Michigan and controlled three-fifths of the
banking resources in Detroit and the state as a whole. Detroit Bankers
and Guardian flourished during the economic boom experienced by
Detroit and Michigan during the 1920s, as a result of the automotive
industry’s rapid expansion. Both organizations made large amounts of
residential and commercial real estate loans. In addition, both companies established securities affiliates, which invested in the stocks of
their parent holding companies and in other securities. Both groups
also made security loans to finance investments by their officers, directors, and other persons in the groups’ holding company stocks and
other stocks.197
Both Detroit Bankers and Guardian were in serious trouble by
1932. Domestic production of automobiles, which was heavily concentrated in the area around Detroit, fell by three-quarters between
1929 and 1932. Detroit’s economy was devastated by a drastic decline in economic activity and high unemployment caused by the
automotive industry’s severe slump.198 By the end of 1932, property
values in Detroit had fallen by nearly half, and there were no buyers
to whom the banks could sell their foreclosed real estate. The two
Detroit banking groups experienced cascading defaults on their real
estate mortgages. About a third of Guardian’s total assets were committed to real estate loans or investments in real estate, while real estate commitments represented about 40 percent of the banking assets
of Detroit Bankers.199
Both banking groups also suffered heavy losses from their securities activities. The Guardian banks held large amounts of the holding
company’s stock as collateral for loans, and the value of that stock
plummeted from US$350 to US$5.50 per share by May 1932. In addition, the holding company, supported by its largest bank and major
shareholders, obtained US$7 million of loans from New York banks
to enable its securities affiliates to carry depreciated securities in their
inventories. A Guardian executive later acknowledged that one of
Guardian’s securities affiliates inflicted “several millions” of losses

Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. 601

on the group.200 Similarly, by 1932 the largest bank in the Detroit
Bankers group held US$25 million of loans collateralized by the
holding company’s stock, which had fallen in value from US$300 to
US$9 per share. From 1931 to 1932, Detroit Bankers incurred losses
of at least US$29 million on securities investments.201
Guardian asked for the RFC’s assistance in 1932, and the RFC
provided an US$8.7 million loan. In January 1933, Guardian asked
for an additional US$50 million to save itself from imminent collapse.
However, the RFC determined that Guardian’s available assets could
only support a loan of US$37 million. In a desperate effort to arrange
a rescue package, the RFC and the Hoover Administration urged
Henry Ford, Guardian’s largest shareholder, to subordinate his deposits in Guardian’s banks. Ford refused, and he also threatened to withdraw his deposits from banks owned by Detroit Bankers, a step that
would have ensured their demise. To avoid the simultaneous failure
of Guardian and Detroit Bankers, Michigan’s governor declared a
statewide bank holiday on February 14, 1933. Both banking groups
were placed in receivership and were too weak to be reopened after
the national bank holiday ended in March. With the help of the RFC,
Ford and General Motors took the lead in organizing and capitalizing
two new banks to serve the Detroit area.202
The Michigan bank holiday had a devastating effect on public
confidence in banks across the country. For the first time, the RFC
had failed in its efforts to rescue major urban banks that were considered essential to the stability of the banking system. Almost immediately, the two largest banking groups in Cleveland—the Union Trust
Company (Union Trust) and the Guardian Trust Company (Guardian
Trust)—suffered heavy deposit withdrawals.203 Similar to the big Detroit banks, Union Trust and Guardian Trust had grown rapidly during
the 1920s and were heavily engaged in real estate lending and real
estate investments. In addition, by 1933 the two groups held a total of
US$25 million of unpaid loans extended to the insolvent empires of
Cyrus Eaton and the Van Sweringen brothers.204
Union Trust and Guardian Trust also resembled the Detroit banks
in their extensive involvement in securities investment and trading
activities. By 1932, Union Trust and Guardian Trust had incurred
losses of US$16.4 million and US$6.6 million, respectively, from
depreciation in their securities portfolios. Both groups included secu-
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rities affiliates. Guardian Trust’s securities affiliate was relatively
small, but Union Trust’s affiliate was a major regional distributor of
securities. By 1933, the net worth of both affiliates was essentially
zero, and together they owed about US$5 million to their parent holding companies.205
The RFC extended about US$30 million of loans to Union Trust
and Guardian Trust in 1932, but the Cleveland banks were too deeply
insolvent to be saved in 1933.206 On February 27, the Ohio legislature
authorized all Ohio banks to impose stringent limits on deposit withdrawals. Those restrictions were immediately applied by the Cleveland banks. By March 4, every other state had followed Michigan and
Ohio in declaring some type of bank holiday or other restriction on
deposit withdrawals. Following the national bank holiday, Union
Trust and Guardian Trust were liquidated. Many of their deposits
were transferred to other Cleveland banks, which reopened with RFC
assistance.207
Large Losses at Other Major Banks with Securities Affiliates
As shown above, the failures of several large banking organizations with extensive securities activities played key roles in the progressive collapse of the U.S. banking system from 1930 to 1933. In
addition, three of the four banks with the largest securities affiliates in
1930—NCB, Chase, and Continental Illinois208—incurred heavy
losses and experienced wrenching changes during the next few years.
NCB’s affiliate, NCC, suffered losses of US$100 million during the
period 1930 to 1933, including heavy losses on its equity investments. NCB was burdened with US$80 million of frozen “bridge
loans” extended to NCC clients in expectation of bond offerings that
were never completed, as well as several million dollars of loans extended to NCB’s officers to finance their purchases of NCB’s stock.
NCB recorded total losses of US$170 million from 1930 to 1934,
wiping out two-thirds of its shareholders’ equity at the end of 1929.209
Chase’s affiliate, CSC, wrote down its capital by US$55 million
during the period 1930 to 1933, reflecting heavy losses on its equity
investments. Chase reported total losses of US$130 million from
1930 to 1934, reducing its net worth at the end of 1929 by more than
half. Many of Chase’s losses resulted from (1) loans made to the Republic of Cuba to support CSC’s underwriting of Cuban bonds, and
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(2) loans and equity investments in support of General Theatres
Equipment, a bankrupt company that had been a major client of
CSC.210
Continental Illinois suffered the worst losses in proportion to its
capital, due in large part to its heavy involvement with Samuel Insull’s utility system. Continental Illinois recorded US$110 million of
losses from 1932 to 1933. It was the first major bank to sell preferred
stock to the RFC in connection with the recapitalization authority
granted to the RFC under the Emergency Banking Act of 1933. Continental Illinois sold US$50 million of preferred stock to the RFC and
reduced its own common stock to US$25 million, thereby recognizing
that the RFC would hold the controlling interest in the bank. The RFC
promptly designated a new chairman for Continental Illinois.211 NCB
and Chase also each sold US$50 million of preferred stock to the
RFC in late 1933, a step that helped each of them to write off losses
on depreciated investments and nonperforming loans.212
The RFC bought more than US$360 million of preferred stock
from 40 of the 100 largest U.S. banks.213 By the time the preferred
stock program ended in 1935, the RFC had provided US$1.3 billion
of new capital to 6,800 banks. At that point, the RFC held one-third
of all bank capital, and it was a stockholder in half of the nation’s
banks.214 The magnitude of these figures indicates the weakness of the
U.S. banking industry in 1933 and the strong need for
government-sponsored recapitalization. The RFC staff determined
that only 20 of the banks that sold preferred stock to the RFC had no
real need for additional capital.215 Together with the newly created
program of federal deposit insurance, the RFC’s preferred stock program played a key role in helping the banking system to recover after
the national bank holiday.216
Notwithstanding RFC help, the banks that had profited most from
the boom years of the 1920s still bore painful scars from the Great
Depression. In mid-1933, the stock prices for NCB, Chase, and Continental Illinois were all more than 90 percent below their peak 1929
values.217 In sharp contrast to the 1920s, large banks no longer found
it easy to raise new capital in the depressed securities markets of the
early 1930s.218 Responding to this “capital crunch,” even the largest
banks “scrambled to shed asset risk” by shifting from loans to highly
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liquid assets like government securities and cash reserves.219 The
amount of outstanding bank loans fell almost in half from 1931 to
1935, while the percentage of bank funds invested in government securities nearly tripled during the period 1929 to 1934.220 Thus, the
drought in new bank lending and the halting recovery of the nation’s
economy after 1933 can be attributed, at least in part, to the banks’
desire to increase their liquidity and reduce their credit risk exposure,
given the terrible losses they had suffered from 1930 to 1933.221

Was Congress Correct in Believing That Securities Affiliates of Banks Were Linked to Conflicts of Interest and
Other Abusive Practices?
Several modern scholars have contended that Congress in 1933
did not have solid evidence for its belief that securities affiliates of
commercial banks had committed serious abuses. Those scholars have
pursued two major lines of attack on the Glass-Steagall Act. First, in a
series of studies, scholars have concluded that “on average, the [securities affiliates of] banks did not sell any worse securities than comparable investment banks.”222 Second, George Benston has contended
that the Pecora committee’s investigation “reveals surprisingly little
support for the charges of abuse” by NCB, Chase, and their securities
affiliates. Benston concludes that “the record does not support the
belief that the pre-Glass-Steagall period was one of abuses and conflicts of interest on the part of banks involved with securities transactions, either directly or through affiliates.”223
I intend to provide a more complete response to these findings in
a future article, after I have completed a full review of the Pecora
hearings. For purposes of the present discussion, I offer two preliminary comments. First, Congress’s decision to adopt the Glass-Steagall
Act was not premised on the view that the underwriting record of
commercial banks was worse than the underwriting performance of
investment banks. Instead, Congress concluded that the involvement
of commercial banks in securities underwriting was dangerous because (1) it compromised the banks’ ability to act as impartial allocators of credit and as objective providers of investment advice, and (2)
it created a hypercompetitive underwriting market that encouraged
both commercial and investment banks to promote speculative,
high-risk issues. Second, a number of scholars have concluded, in
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contrast to Benston, that the Pecora committee did uncover substantial evidence of abusive conduct by NCB and Chase, the two largest
commercial banks with the two most important securities affiliates.
The Comparative Underwriting Performance of Commercial
Bank Affiliates and Traditional Investment Banks
A number of scholars have examined the comparative underwriting record of commercial bank affiliates and traditional investment
banks during the 1920s. Two early studies concluded that the performance of securities underwritten by commercial bank affiliates, in
terms of default history and stability of market price, was about the
same as the record for securities underwritten by traditional investment banks.224 Using regression analysis, three modern studies found
that securities underwritten by commercial bank affiliates generally
performed better than securities underwritten by investment banks.225
However, two of those studies determined that commercial bank affiliates underwrote higher-quality securities. In this regard, the bonds
underwritten by bank affiliates (1) were typically issued in bigger
amounts by larger and more seasoned issuers and (2) carried lower
yields (i.e., higher prices to investors). Thus, the superior performance of bonds underwritten by commercial bank affiliates was consistent with the fact that those bonds exhibited lower risk and “were
priced higher” at the time of their issuance.226 Bank affiliates were
involved in syndicated offerings that typically included a larger number of underwriters, thereby indicating that bank affiliates were chosen for their “large distribution networks that [could] provide a
comparative advantage in handling large, syndicated issues.”227
The foregoing studies indicate that the underwriting performance
of commercial bank affiliates was generally comparable to the record
for traditional investment banks, after taking account of the higher
quality of bonds underwritten by the bank affiliates. However, two of
the studies also identified outliers in the bank affiliate and investment
bank groups. One study found that bonds underwritten by J.P.
Morgan and Kuhn, Loeb, the leading private investment banks,
compiled the best default performance among all underwriters for
bonds issued during the period 1926 to 1930.228 In contrast, bonds
underwritten by NCB and Chase, the two largest banks with the two
most important securities affiliates, posted a default record that was
inferior to the performance of bonds underwritten by other bank
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affiliates and, in one study, was also worse than the performance of
bonds underwritten by investment banks.229 In addition, the stock
prices of NYSE-listed companies that issued bonds underwritten by
NCB and Chase performed “somewhat more poorly” than
NYSE-listed companies that issued bonds underwritten by other
underwriters.230 Thus, the two commercial bank affiliates that were
most prominent in the securities business, and that received the
greatest scrutiny during the Pecora hearings, produced the worst
overall record among bank affiliates.
Although the foregoing studies provide important data regarding
the comparative underwriting performance of bank affiliates and
investment banks, they do not respond to the core concerns of
Congress in 1933. Congress did not enact the Glass-Steagall Act
because it thought that commercial bank affiliates were more
unscrupulous or less competent than traditional investment banks.
Instead, Congress concluded that the involvement of commercial
banks in securities underwriting was dangerous because (1) it
promoted excessive competition within the underwriting business and
encouraged both commercial banks and investment banks to abandon
prudential standards and promote speculative, unsound issues, and (2)
it undermined the ability of commercial banks to act as impartial
allocators of credit and objective providers of investment advice. In
addition, Congress determined that it was hazardous to link the
lending capacity of deposit-taking banks with the placing power of
securities underwriters. In Congress’s view, the linkage of the two
activities had produced a financing surge that led to speculative
overinvestment during the period 1924 to 1929 and economic
catastrophe during the period 1930 to 1933. Accordingly, the
Glass-Steagall Act was motivated by Congress’s desire to prevent
excessive speculation in the financial markets that could spill over
into the general economy. Congress believed that the removal of
deposit-taking banks from the securities underwriting business was a
prophylactic measure needed to accomplish its anti-speculative
purpose.231
During its deliberations on the Glass-Steagall Act, Congress did
not focus on the comparative underwriting performance of commercial bank affiliates and investment banks because that comparison
was not pertinent to its central objective. As indicated above, Congress clearly believed that investment banks engaged in abusive prac-
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tices and promoted the sale of highly speculative securities (especially
those issued by foreign governments, investment trusts, and utility
holding companies) during the 1920s.232 Congress’s investigation of
investment banks provided the impetus for several statutes designed
to regulate the conduct of firms that issue and underwrite securities,
including the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, and the Investment Company Act of 1940.233 Congress determined that its
anti-speculative purpose could be accomplished by restricting the
lending power of investment banks. Congress adopted Section 21 of
the Glass-Steagall Act to prohibit investment banks from accepting
deposits, thereby severing underwriters of securities from a major
funding source.234 In contrast, Congress did not see any reliable
means, short of strict separation, for keeping commercial banks from
using their deposit-based lending capacity to promote speculative and
destructive behavior in the securities markets.235
The Pecora Committee’s Evidentiary Record
The hearing transcripts and summary report produced by the
Pecora committee during its investigation of 1933–34 are the primary
sources of evidence relating to allegations of conflicts of interest and
other abusive practices involving securities affiliates of commercial
banks.236 After reviewing those materials, George Benston concluded
that the Pecora committee’s investigation produced “very little
evidence” of the alleged abuses.237 Relying in part on Benston’s work,
Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales similarly contend that “there is
little evidence of the purported abuses in the specific cases examined
by the Pecora Committee.”238 The conclusions of Benston, Rajan, and
Zingales differ from the views of earlier scholars who reviewed the
records of the Pecora investigation. I will not attempt to resolve this
scholarly disagreement in this chapter. However, I intend to present
my own evaluation of the Pecora hearings in a future article. For
present purposes, I will provide a brief overview of the findings of
scholars who have disagreed with Benston, Rajan, and Zingales.
Prior to Benston, W. Nelson Peach provided the most extensive
analysis of the Pecora hearings. As Peach noted, the hearings focused
particularly on NCB, Chase, and their securities affiliates (NCC and
CSC). Peach determined that the Pecora investigation produced evidence of “[a] great many abuses and defects … in connection with the
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operation of security affiliates by national banks.”239 Peach grouped
those alleged abuses into four general categories: (1) the sale of “unsound and speculative securities,” accompanied by prospectuses that
contained “untruthful and misleading information”; (2) “pool operations” that manipulated the stock prices of industrial corporations and
the affiliates’ parent banks; (3) “the use of affiliates for the personal
profit of officers of banks and affiliates”; and (4) “the mixing of
commercial and investment banking functions.”240 Subsequent scholars have agreed with Peach that the Pecora investigation provided
substantial support for all of these allegations.
Regarding the first alleged abuse, Peach focused on the sale of
foreign bonds, many of which had defaulted by the time of the Pecora
investigation. Peach and subsequent scholars determined that commercial bank affiliates and traditional investment banks had been “indiscriminate” in underwriting speculative issues of foreign bonds, due
to the lucrative fees that could be earned from that business. Peach
and others charged that bank affiliates and investment banks sold foreign bonds to unsophisticated investors without disclosure of their
inherent risks.241 In concluding that bank affiliates sold foreign bonds
while disregarding known risks, Peach and other scholars cited
NCC’s decision to underwrite bonds issued by the Republic of Peru
and the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais despite reports from NCC’s
agents indicating that neither government would be able to repay its
debts.242
Concerning the second alleged abuse, Peach and other scholars
cited stock pool operations, in which NCC and CSC participated, that
manipulated the stock prices of several major U.S. corporations. In
addition, NCC and CSC helped to distribute shares of the same companies to public investors while their pool operations were artificially
supporting the market price. Similarly, NCC and CSC maintained
almost continuous pools to boost the stock prices for their parent
banks while they actively promoted the distribution of those stocks to
public investors.243
I will not recount Peach’s analysis of alleged abuses by officers
of NCC and CSC, since those abuses were arguably the acts of rogue
agents rather than conflicts of interest inherent in the bank-affiliate
system.244 In addressing the fourth alleged abuse, Peach concentrated
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on financial arrangements between banks and their securities affiliates. In one case, NCB transferred to NCC US$25 million in defaulted Cuban sugar loans, which bank examiners had criticized. NCB
accomplished this transfer by selling US$50 million of its stock and
using the proceeds to increase the capital stock of NCB and NCC by
US$25 million each. NCC transferred the US$25 million it received
to a subsidiary, which paid the same US$25 million to NCB to buy
the defaulted loans. NCC later wrote down the value of its subsidiary
to US$1. In practical effect, NCB had used NCC as a dumping
ground for its bad loans and as camouflage to prevent its shareholders
from realizing that proceeds of NCB’s stock sale were being used to
write off the loans.245
In a second case, Chase provided more than US$10 million of
loans to support a public offering of US$40 million of Cuban bonds
by CSC and other underwriters at a time when Cuba was highly
unlikely to repay either the loans or the bonds.246 As noted above,
Chase also lost US$70 million on equity investments and loans it
made to support CSC’s underwriting activities for General Theatres
Equipment, which declared bankruptcy in 1932.247 NCB suffered
losses on US$80 million of bridge loans it extended to clients of NCC
in connection with bond offerings that could not be completed.248 In
addition, unsound loans and investments made by banks to support
the activities of securities affiliates were prominent features in the
failures of CAC, BUS, and Central Republic.249 As Peach explained,
the symbiotic relationship between banks and their securities affiliates
grew out of their deliberate decision to market themselves as unified,
full-service organizations. Peach concluded that Congress could not
have enacted legislation to prevent banks from supporting their affiliates without destroying the business plan on which they had operated
during the 1920s:
Affiliates and banks were legally separate corporations. In
practice, however, they were parts of the same organization
… providing their customers with complete financial facilities under one roof. The close relationship between banks
and affiliates was intentionally fostered, and it was due to
their ability to convince the investing public that bank and
affiliate were part of the same organization that affiliates
were able to sell such a large volume of securities during the
twenties. Since, when the securities were sold, the public had
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been persuaded that bank and affiliate were parts of the same
organization, the bank could not escape responsibility for the
activities of its affiliate when the securities began to decline
in value after the stock market crisis of 1929. It became necessary for banks to assist their affiliates because they were
aware that any diminution in the good will of their affiliates
would bring with it a corresponding diminution in their own.
This is the chief difficulty in the affiliate system. … Any
legislation which sought to prevent such relationships and
the advantages arising from them would automatically destroy the basis on which the affiliate system was established.250
The most prominent example of Peach’s thesis was NCB. By
1929, NCB was a “global, all-purpose financial intermediary [that]
provided corporations, households, and governments with commercial banking, investment banking, and trust services.”251 NCB and its
affiliates operated as a single enterprise that worked together to “tailor financial packages to the customer’s requirements.”252 Accordingly, the concept of an integrated, full-service financial intermediary
was “the rationale underpinning National City’s comprehensive strategy.”253 Charles Mitchell publicly embraced this strategy when he
declared that NCB’s goal was to give its clients “a complete banking
and investment and trust service. … Now, if those businesses can be
done by a single organization it is very much the better. … Those are
all functions which the average client likes to conduct under one roof,
so to speak.”254 As the conduct of NCB, Chase, and other banks demonstrated, the 1920s concept of full-service department store banking
strongly encouraged commercial banks to support their securities affiliates whenever the affiliates encountered serious problems.255
The abuses catalogued by Peach, particularly those dealing with
the use of bank resources to support securities affiliates, appear to be
substantial and warrant further analysis of the evidence produced by
the Pecora investigation. Peach’s doubts about the wisdom of allowing banks to combine lending, securities investments, securities underwriting, and investment advice are similar to current concerns
about the highly integrated nature of today’s financial conglomerates.
For the same reasons voiced by Charles Mitchell, financial conglomerates currently seek to create synergies by marketing their services
under a unified brand and by presenting themselves to customers as a
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single enterprise offering “one-stop shopping.” Moreover, these institutions routinely offer package deals that combine lending and securities underwriting services for corporate clients. The close
relationships among affiliated subsidiaries within a financial conglomerate make it unlikely that structural firewalls will be able to
prevent serious problems in one subsidiary from endangering the entire organization.256 Accordingly, a careful review of the Pecora
committee’s investigation of NCB, Chase, and other universal banks
of the 1920s may shed useful light on the potential risks of today’s
financial conglomerates.

Conclusions and Directions for Further Research
Carter Glass, Henry Steagall, and their supporters offered a critique of universal banking that was more persuasive than their modern critics have acknowledged. In Congress’s view, universal banks
helped to foster a speculative boom from 1924 to 1929 that produced
high-risk investments, hazardous debt burdens, and overextended real
estate and industrial sectors, all of which contributed to the economic
bust of 1930–33. Congress also determined that problems created by
universal banks were important factors in the progressive collapse of
the banking system during the period 1930–33. Congress placed
much of the blame for the Great Depression on policy mistakes made
by the Federal Reserve System from 1924 to 1933. However, Congress believed that universal banks helped to lay the foundation for
the economic calamity that occurred during the early 1930s.
Based on the analysis set forth above, I have reached the following tentative conclusions regarding the claims made by Glass and his
supporters in 1931–33. First, universal banks contributed to the extraordinary economic boom of 1924–29 by significantly expanding
their involvement in five separate financing channels—loans on securities, securities investments, public offerings of securities, real estate
mortgages, and consumer credit. Second, the large-scale entry of
commercial banks into the securities markets created competitive
pressures that caused commercial bank affiliates and traditional investment banks to abandon prudential standards and promote highly
speculative domestic and foreign ventures. Third, the financing surge
of the 1920s produced unsustainable asset booms in both the real estate and securities markets. It also left the consumer and business sec-
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tors in a highly fragile condition at the end of 1929, due to their heavy
debt burdens and risky investments.
Fourth, universal banks also contributed significantly to banking
problems during the period 1930–33. The largest universal banks,
which were also money center banks, undermined the soundness of
smaller correspondent banks by encouraging them to purchase
high-risk securities during the 1920s. Losses on securities proved to
be a major cause of bank failures during the 1930s. In addition, several large universal banks failed in 1930, 1932, and 1933. Those failures triggered regional banking panics and also caused a widespread
loss of depositor confidence in the banking system. Other universal
banks avoided failure only because they received timely assistance
from the RFC. Failures or near-failures of universal banks typically
resulted from decisions by bankers to make risky investments and
loans to support their own stock prices and to prop up affiliates and
customers of those affiliates.
The experience of the U.S. banking industry from 1921 to 1933
raises provocative questions about the possible linkages between financial liberalization, broader powers for banks, asset booms, banking crises, and economic depressions. The evidence reviewed above
suggests a clear connection between the liberalization of bank powers
after 1910 and the tremendous expansion of financing for consumers
and business firms after 1920. The financing surge of the 1920s coincided with extraordinary asset booms in the real estate and securities
markets, and with rapid growth in business facilities and inventories.
When the easy availability of credit and equity financing ended in
1929, the asset booms collapsed, followed quickly by sharp declines
in consumer demand and industrial production. Within a year after the
collapse of the asset booms, serious banking problems began to
emerge. Were all of these events causally related?
In searching for answers to this question, scholars have reviewed
the experiences of other nations during the 1920s and 1930s. Scholars
have found that nations with prominent universal banks (e.g., Austria,
Belgium, France, Italy, and Germany) experienced severe banking
crises because their banks were weakened by close linkages with
troubled industries. In contrast, nations with specialized banks that
were barred from engaging in securities dealing or underwriting (e.g.,
Canada and the United Kingdom) survived the 1930s without a major
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banking crisis. In addition, the presence of effective lenders of last
resort in Canada and the United Kingdom helped to stabilize their
banking systems.257
A particularly interesting contrast can be drawn between the experiences of the United Kingdom and the United States during this
period. The narrow powers, oligopolistic structure, and conservatism
of major U.K. banks during the 1920s contrasted sharply with the
broad powers, competitiveness, and aggressive policies of leading
U.S. banks. The United Kingdom experienced no boom during the
1920s but also avoided any banking crisis or severe economic slump
during the 1930s. Does the U.K. experience suggest that countries
that forgo financial liberalization can avoid the threat of a
boom-and-bust cycle but must assume the risks of economic stagnation? Many British leaders were unhappy with the performance of the
U.K. banking industry during the 1920s. Indeed, the 1931 report of
the Macmillan Committee on Finance and Industry called upon Parliament to allow U.K. banks to enter the securities markets, as U.S.
banks had done during the 1920s.258 Of course, the Macmillan report
was issued before the magnitude of the U.S. banking crisis became
evident.
The experience of Japan since 1985 presents another instructive
case study, which includes a number of features similar to the U.S.
experience of 1921–33. Japan’s government gradually deregulated its
financial markets and followed a liberal monetary policy during the
second half of the 1980s. During that period, Japan’s economy benefited from a rapid growth in financing through increased bank lending
and the issuance of new securities. The government allowed Japanese
corporations to secure cheaper credit through increased access to the
Japanese bond market and the Eurobond market. Because large Japanese corporations cut their demand for bank loans, Japanese banks
eagerly expanded their involvement in real estate lending. Japanese
banks were not allowed to engage in securities underwriting, but they
were permitted to own corporate stocks. During the 1980s, Japanese
banks built up huge portfolios of corporate shares to profit from the
booming stock market and also to maintain strong cross-shareholding
relationships with nonbank firms in the banks’ respective corporate
groups (keiretsu). Japanese regulators and the Basel Capital Accord of
1988 encouraged these stock investments by allowing Japanese banks

614 The Role of Universal Banks in the Boom-and-Bust Cycle of 1921–33

to rely on unrealized capital gains from their stock portfolios to satisfy a significant portion of their capital requirements.
The rapid expansion of securities issuances, securities
investments, and bank loans produced a “bubble economy” in Japan
during the late 1980s, as reflected in dramatic booms in the real estate
and securities markets. Given the abundant sources of new financing,
Japanese firms greatly increased their investments in production
facilities, equipment, and real estate projects. In an effort to restrain
the “bubble economy,” the Bank of Japan tightened its monetary
policy significantly in 1990. The Bank of Japan’s restrictive monetary
regime triggered a progressive collapse of both the securities and real
estate markets. Japanese banks cut back on their lending, because
they were burdened with severely depreciated stock portfolios and an
estimated US$1 trillion in nonperforming loans. The reluctance of
Japanese banks to make new loans produced a severe “credit crunch”
that lasted from the mid-1990s through 2004. Industrial production
and consumer spending declined sharply during the 1990s, resulting
in a prolonged economic slump. Despite more than US$1 trillion of
government stimulus programs and another US$200 billion of
government assistance for banks, the Japanese economy stagnated
and several leading banks, securities firms, and insurance companies
failed. Other major financial institutions survived only through
government-supported mergers. Only in 2005 did analysts glimpse
the beginning of a sustained recovery in the Japanese economy and
banking system. As in the case of the worldwide Great Depression of
the 1930s, analysts have studied the Japanese crisis to find clues to
the apparent connections between financial liberalization, asset
booms, and increased risks for systemic banking and economic
crises.259
Finally, one might ask whether dangerous asset booms are more
likely to occur during periods when major financial institutions face
intense competitive pressures and also have a greater ability to exploit
conflicts of interest. The concerns expressed by Congress in 1933
about universal banking powers—particularly with regard to conflicts
of interest and links between lending and securities underwriting—
have already been echoed by some commentators on the collapse of
Enron and WorldCom and other financial scandals during the U.S.
boom-and-bust cycle of 1994–2002.260 I intend to examine those
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scandals in a forthcoming article and to evaluate whether reforms are
needed in the supervision of financial conglomerates.
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